is apparent that the legislature intended to state that the second requirement for service under the Act must be that the cause of action be one arising within the Commonwealth. It was so held in Electrosonics International, Inc. v. Wurlitzer Co., 234 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.Pa.1964). It is elementary that a cause of action does not arise upon the starting of an action in court; indeed the cause of action must have arisen at some time prior to the commencement of the action in court.
Because this cause of action arose in Illinois where plaintiff was injured, these are not actions "arising within this Commonwealth" and the service upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law must be quashed. We are not unmindful of the holdings on this issue by this Court in three other cases, in Spry v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 234 F. Supp. 580 (W.D.Pa.1964) and Sterling Box Co. v. Morning-star-Paisley, Inc., 36 F.R.D. 96 (W.D.Pa.1964) and in an unreported memorandum order in Hopkins v. Sohio Petroleum Co. at Civil Action No. 65-240. The legislative history of this statute, however, convinces us that our present conclusion is the proper one. We are not required to follow a rule of law enunciated by a colleague in a different case. United States v. Mathies, 350 F.2d 963 (3 Cir., 1965).
The complaint at Civil Action No. 65-752 must be dismissed for the further reason of improper venue under the Jones Act. That statute provides that "[jurisdiction] in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located." For venue purposes, a corporation "resides" only where it is incorporated. Leith v. Oil Transport Co., 321 F.2d 591 (3 Cir. 1963). Because the complaint alleges that defendant is "incorporated in a state other than Pennsylvania, with its principal office at Houston, Texas," venue is improperly laid in this District.
Likewise, in the action for maintenance and cure at No. 65-37 in Admiralty, venue is improperly laid in the Western District of Pennsylvania. "We recognize that admiralty has no special restrictive rules of venue applicable to libels in personam." Leith v. Oil Transport Co., supra at 593. A "libel in personam may be maintained for any [maritime] cause * * * wherever a monition can be served upon the libelee, or an attachment made of any personal property or credits of his; * * *." In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 490, 10 S. Ct. 587, 588, 33 L. Ed. 991 (1890). "Only in the absence of any such prospect of obtaining personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction quasi in rem may dismissal of the libel be a proper exercise of discretion." Leith v. Oil Transport Co., supra, at 594. It has already been pointed out above that the service of process attempting to obtain personal jurisdiction of defendant is inadequate. No attachment of any res within this district has been made, nor has there been any showing that there is any prospect of such a procedure. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motions to quash service of process and to dismiss the actions must be granted.
An appropriate order will be entered.