the Federal Employers' Liability Act and not according to any Pennsylvania common-law action and thus this Court is of the opinion that the basic law of Pennsylvania remains unchanged under Blair except as to those cases encompassing the F.E.L.A.
Plaintiff further contends that the verdict of $50,000 awarded by the jury did not satisfy his out-and-out financial impairment and was the result of a compromise verdict. While it is true that plaintiff would be entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages if the record disclosed no good reason for the compromise verdict, Hose v. Hake, 412 Pa. 10, 192 A.2d 339 (1963), lack of sufficient evidence cannot be presumed from the mere dollar amount of the verdict. Furthermore compromise verdicts are expected and allowed where the evidence of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of the risk is conflicting. In such cases the Court will respect the time honored right of a jury to render such verdicts. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). Therefore, there is nothing to indicate either that the jury failed to understand the nature and seriousness of the plaintiff's injury or that it failed to award him a sum sufficient to compensate him for such injury.
Plaintiff was afforded the unusual opportunity of placing before the jury a screen upon which was projected all of his arithmetical computations as to his past, present and future financial loss due to his physical impairment. The jury had the benefit of viewing all of these figures while plaintiff's counsel was explaining the meaning and relationship of each figure to plaintiff's earning capacity. Under these circumstances, needless to say, plaintiff was given every opportunity to impress upon the jury his entire financial loss, and the verdict rendered by the jury was in accordance with what they considered proper and adequate.
This Court deems plaintiff's remaining contentions without merit. If any errors were committed, the errors were not of the nature as to make them prejudicial.
A careful review of the record shows that the plaintiff received a fair trial and the verdict of $50,000 awarded by the jury was substantial and adequate. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for new trial as to the issue of damages is denied.
MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. OR FOR A NEW TRIAL
Defendants contend that plaintiff's injury was caused by his voluntary assumption of risk and/or his contributory negligence, and therefore the Court should grant defendants' motions. Furthermore, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to prove a claim upon which relief could be granted since the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and plaintiff failed to show any negligence on the part of the defendants.
As to defendants' aforestated contention, the Court finds that the entire matter was one that rested within the province of the jury. Before a court can be justified in declaring a person contributorily negligent as a matter of law evidence of such negligence must be so clear and unmistakable that there can be no reasonable basis remaining for any contrary inference to be suggested. Mogren v. Gadonas, 358 Pa. 507, 58 A.2d 150 (1948).
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, the evidence and inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to the party having the verdict and against whom the motion is directed; and if the evidence and inference considered in such manner would permit reasonable men in the exercise of their judgment to reach different conclusions respecting the critical issues, the motions should be denied. Downey v. Union Paving Co., 184 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1947).
The Court has found no prejudice, after carefully reviewing the entire case, and accordingly, will not alter the verdict of the jury.
And now, this eighteenth day of August, 1965, it is ordered that the motion of Stephen A. Walsh, plaintiff, for a new trial limited to the issue of damages only be and the same is denied.
It is further ordered that the motion of Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc. and Edward Stern and Company, Inc., defendants, for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial be and the same is denied.
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