42. As a result of such heavy imbalance, Provident has sustained losses under the policies. The premiums presently being charged by Provident for coverage including the retired employees is actuarially unsound. Substantial increases would be necessary to place them on an actuarially sound basis.
43. Provident cannot unilaterally terminate the policies or raise the premiums thereto prior to October 1, 1965 in the absence of a modification to the terms and conditions of the policy.
44. In January, 1965, Provident, through its local representative, N.W. Rauchut, contacted Lee and Advised it of the imbalance in the group. Provident suggested as a remedy either higher premiums for the retired group, additional active employees to be included within the group, or a modification of the policy so as to terminate coverage for both retired salary and retired hourly employees. As a result of discussions between Provident and Lee, it was agreed that coverage for both retired salary and retired hourly employees would be terminated effective June 1, 1965.
It is a well-established principle of law that the party praying for injunctive relief must demonstrate a reasonable probability of success upon final hearing. Eagle-Freedman-Roedelheim Co. v. Allison Mfg. Co., 204 F.Supp. 679 (E.D.Pa.1962); North Carolina Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 200 F.Supp. 740, 743 (D.Del.1961). Our review has not led us to such assurance of the Plaintiffs' success.
Further, this Court cannot find as a fact that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing irreparable injury such as would justify the granting of a preliminary injunction. Murray Hill Restaurant, Inc. v. Thirteen Twenty One Locust, 98 F.2d 578 (3rd Cir. 1938).
In its consideration the Court is not unmindful of the need to balance the competing equities. Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n. v. Port of Phila. M.T. Ass'n., 183 F.Supp. 910, 918 (E.D.Pa.1960). However, it is axiomatic that great caution is to be exercised in meting out the drastic relief of a preliminary injunction. ibid. Under all the circumstances herein existing, the Court has not felt persuaded to do so. Accordingly, the Court makes the followings
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this action.
2. The determination of Plaintiffs' right to the preliminary relief requested herein depends upon an interpretation of the policies issued by the various insurance companies insuring Lee's group insurance plan, the booklets distributed to the employees explaining the plan and other documents, as well as a determination of the intent of the officers and Board of Directors adopting and ratifying the plan, all of which are in serious dispute herein.
3. Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that they will prevail upon final hearing on the merits herein.
4. Plaintiffs have failed to show a clear right to the extraordinary relief requested herein.
5. Plaintiffs have failed to show that they will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction requested herein is not granted pending a final hearing on the merits herein.
6. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction, as prayed for, preventing Lee and Provident from discontinuing or otherwise affecting the life and medical insurance coverage provided Plaintiffs under Lee's group insurance plan, pending a final hearing on the merits herein.
In accordance with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the foregoing reasons, it is the ruling of this Court that Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction be and the same is hereby denied, and it is so ordered.
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