the inadvisability of federal court interference with a state prosecution. 184 F.2d at 124-125.
In Outdoor American Corporation v. City of Philadelphia, 333 F.2d 963 (C.A. 3, 1964), the court upheld the district court's refusal to interfere with a state prosecution.
In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951), the court refused to prevent the use of certain evidence in a state criminal proceeding. Speaking for the Court, Justice Frankfurter said at pp. 122-123, 72 S. Ct. pp. 121-122:
'* * * If these considerations limit federal courts in restraining State prosecutions merely threatened, how much more cogent are they to prevent federal interference with proceedings once begun. If the federal equity power must refrain from staying State prosecutions outright to try the central question of the validity of the statute on which the prosecution is based, how much more reluctant must it be to intervene piecemeal to try collateral issues.
'The consequences of exercising the equitable power here invoked are not the concern of a merely doctrinaire alertness to protect the proper sphere of the States in enforcing their criminal law. If we were to sanction this intervention, we would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law -- with its far-flung and undefined range -- would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconstitutionality in the impaneling and selection of the grand and petit juries, in the failure to appoint counsel, in the admission of a confession, in the creation of an unfair trial atmosphere, in the misconduct of the trial court -- all would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local crime in local courts. To suggest these difficulties is to recognize their solution. * * *'
Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. Ed. 1324 (1942); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 55 S. Ct. 678, 79 L. Ed. 1322 (1935).
While the remedy of mandamus is at law, its allowance is controlled by equitable principles. See United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359, 53 S. Ct. 614, 77 L. Ed. 1250 (1933). Applying these principles, we deny the writ because there is no clear and imminent irreparable injury threatened. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 at 183, 63 S. Ct. 877. I must assume the state courts will protect petitioner's constitutional rights.
Therefore, whether this action be deemed injunction or mandamus, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief at the hand of this court at this time.