proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was compensated on a salary basis (29 C.F.R. §§ 541.118(b) and 54 1.212) and that the plaintiff did not devote more than 20 percent of his hours in the workweek to activities not directly and closely related to the performance of work described in PP (a) through (d) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 and in PP (a) through (c) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.2.
Plaintiff was guaranteed a salary of $ 114 (gross) per week. During the period in question, it was only required that he be compensated on a salary basis of not less than $ 95 per week in order that both 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) and 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) have application.
This was the situation, as I view the evidence.
I am also convinced that the promotional activities, solicitation of new business, and effort devoted to development of new freight terminal facilities and recruiting of managerial personnel therefor was work directly and closely related to the performance of the executive and administrative work described in PP (a) through (d) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 and in PP (a) through (c) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.2. A close reading of 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.108, 541.201(a), 541.205, 541.208(e) and 541.208(f) reveals that those regulations lend substantial support to my conclusion.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and to 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
2. At all pertinent times, the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207.
3. At all pertinent times, plaintiff was employed by the defendant in a bona fide executive capacity and in a bona fide administrative capacity within the meaning of § 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
4. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.