the foreign corporation is a jurisdictional sine qua non. Only by a distortion of the language employed by the legislature can 'acts or omissions' on the part of the foreign corporation be equated with 'where the injury arose' or 'where the right or cause of action arose'. It is a legislative, not judicial, function to extend or enlarge jurisdiction over foreign corporations and the legislature has seen fit to enlarge such jurisdiction subject, inter alia, to the limitation that the action must arise out of 'acts or omissions' of such foreign corporation within Pennsylvania. Such legislatively prescribed limitation is binding upon us.'
The Court stated further: ( Pages 17-18, 173 A.2d page 126)
'We find no difficulty in holding that the activities of this company carried on and pursued in this Commonwealth through the medium of the distributors, -- bound to the company by restrictive type agreements -- and, especially, the activities of the sales representatives -- full-time employees regularly and systematically soliciting business and engaging in other activities for the company -- constituted 'doing business' within the Commonwealth. The sales representatives certainly carried on and performed a 'series of similar acts' in Pennsylvania; to hold that their purpose was not the realization of pecuniary benefit is to ignore the obvious.'
The Court in Rufo although finding that the Company had done business in Pennsylvania within the intendment of Section 1011, subd. C, found lacking the commission of 'acts' or 'omissions' by the Company in Pennsylvania which the Court designated a jurisdictional sine qua non under Section 1011, subd. B as then existing. But the Court also stated: ( Page 20, 173 A.2d page 127)
'The question is not where the injury occurred or where the cause of action arose; where did the company's negligent acts or omissions take place? If the legislature meant 'cause of action' or 'right of action', it could and would have so stated. Indeed, if the legislature meant 'right of action' or 'cause of action' it would have omitted the words 'out of acts or omissions of the corporation' and the provision would have read 'in any action arising within the Commonwealth.' * * *'
In the amendment of Section 1011, subd. B, by the Act of August 13, 1963, the legislature did precisely what the Court suggested as above, to wit: the amendment does omit the words 'out of acts or omissions of such corporation' and did substitute in lieu thereof the words 'in any action arising within this Commonwealth'. This amendment marks another step in the gradual evolution of this matter of process against foreign corporations.
In the instant case, as did the Court in Rufo, supra, I find no difficulty in holding that the activities of the Agency carried on and pursued in Pennsylvania constituted 'doing business' in Pennsylvania.
While in Rufo the Court could find no 'acts' or 'omissions' in Pennsylvania as required by Section 1011, subd. B, in the instant case, in the light of the 1963 amendment, I do find substantial indication of 'any action arising within this Commonwealth' as presently required by the amended Section 1011, subd. B.
In the instant case, according to facts alleged in the Complaint, defendant from December 1, 1963 to the present time had four of its employees in this District for the purpose of contacting plaintiff's members in order to get them to withdraw from plaintiff and, as a result of this spade work, many of plaintiff's members did sign the withdrawal slip mailed to them by defendant from New York and did withdraw from plaintiff and did terminate their processors' marketing agreement with plaintiff. This is the action arising in Pennsylvania alleged in the Complaint.
Motion to dismiss will be denied.