the same previously enumerated in the Curtis and Martin actions.
The Tidewater suit presents two causes of action, the first is pleaded under § 303, and the second, purports to assert a 'common law diversity claim' against the individual representatives of the defendant unions. This second claim was subject to a prior motion to dismiss by the S.I.U. and one of the individual union representatives. 206 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Pa.1962). Judge Van Dusen granted the motion as to the defendant Cardullo 'without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to file an amendment to the Complaint, making a claim against him as an individual only and not as a representative of a labor organization if the facts permit such amendment.' (see p. 766).
Our examination of the record reveals no such amendment as having been filed.
The present motion is filed by the N.M.U., I.L.A., I.M.W.U., Richard Askew, Louis Parise and Shannon J. Wall. The motion is directed at the § 303 cause of action and the common law cause of action.
For the identical reasons previously expressed, the motion attacking the § 303 cause of action for compensatory damages is denied, but such motion is granted insofar as the various claims for punitive damages and counsel fees are pleaded under § 303.
The 'common law' cause of action is based on the same conduct alleged in the § 303 claim. We note that Tidewater incorporates paragraphs 3 to 13 inclusive of the first cause of action into the second claim. Paragraphs 4 through 8 name the Unions as defendants and are incorporated by paragraph 17. As to these union defendants there is no jurisdiction on common law principles to award damages under state law. Local 20, Teamsters, etc. Union v. Morton, supra.
The plaintiff argues in its brief that the second cause of action is directed only at the individual defendants named: Askew, Wall, and Parise under the common law of Pennsylvania. However, as we read the Complaint each of these defendants is named in paragraphs 18, 19 and 21 as either an officer or responsible representative of the defendant unions. Proof of the second claim will depend upon the establishment of the Unions' liability under the § 303 claim. If these individual defendants are found liable, it will automatically make the unions liable since under § 301(b) a union is liable for the acts of its agents. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S. Ct. 1318, 8 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1962). Both of these claims are inextricably intertwined.
To require individual union officers to respond in damages for their authorized
acts, done on behalf of the union, under any theory of state law would be contrary to the national labor policy. For these reasons Tidewater's second action is governed by the N.L.R.A. and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Atkinson v. Sinclair, supra, p. 249, 82 S. Ct. p. 1325.
AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 1964, in Civil Actions Nos. 29757 and 29758 the defendants' motions to dismiss are granted as to the § 303 cause of action without prejudice to Navios and Universe to file amended Complaints asserting their claims under the common law or any other applicable theories.
It is further ordered that in Civil Actions Nos. 29759, 29760, 29761 and 29762, the defendants' motions to dismiss the § 303 cause of action in each Complaint are denied as to the plaintiffs' respective claims for compensatory damages; but such motions are granted insofar as the claims for punitive damages and counsel fees are pleaded under § 303 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
It is further ordered that in Civil Actions Nos. 29759 and 29760 the defendants' motions to dismiss the second cause of action in each Complaint are granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
It is further ordered that in Civil Action No. 29762 the defendants' motion to dismiss the second cause of action is granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.