The opinion of the court was delivered by: FREEDMAN
Relator has attacked by a petition for habeas corpus his conviction in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County on charges of burglary, larceny, receiving stolen goods and conspiracy. He claims that his conviction was based on evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure, in contravention of the constitutional rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
The state court both in a pre-trial hearing and on a subsequent motion to suppress during trial had ruled that the stolen goods seized by the authorities were properly admissible in evidence. On June 4, 1964, in United States ex rel. McKenna v. Myers, 230 F.Supp. 278, I denied the petition for habeas corpus, without prejudice. As I there stated, I considered it undesirable to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the state court's factual conclusion because there had now intruded a question regarding the relator's absence from the pre-trial hearing, a question which had never been presented to the state courts and which might involve state as well as federal constitutional rights. I stated that my view was that the record should not be finally judged until this constitutional question was decided, even though I had reviewed the evidence at the pre-trial hearing and at the trial and believed that it thoroughly supported the state court's conclusion on the search and seizure issue. I therefore remitted the relator to the state courts to exhaust his remedies there.
The relator has now filed a motion for rehearing in which he disclaims his intention to raise any constitutional question regarding his absence from the pretrial hearing and urges that a decision be rendered by this Court on the validity of the search and seizure.
The search and seizure admittedly was neither authorized by a search warrant nor was it incidental to an arrest. The prosecution claimed that it was justified because the relator's mother gave her consent to the agents
to enter and search the house which she owned and in which relator lived with her.
Relator contends that his mother's consent, even if given, could not bind him. He also indirectly raises the factual question whether his mother's consent was coerced.
1. The legal question may be disposed of summarily. In the circumstances here presented the voluntary consent of relator's mother, if it was given, would be binding on the relator and would preclude the claim of violation of his constitutional rights.
The cases relied on by relator are distinguishable and do not support a contrary rule.
The disputed issue of consent was twice presented in the state court, first at a pre-trial hearing on a petition to suppress the evidence seized by the authorities and again at the subsequent trial on a renewed motion to suppress, made at the close of the Commonwealth's case. If the relator received a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court proceedings and the findings there made are reliable, there is no reason, under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963), for me to hold an evidentiary hearing and redetermine the issue.
I have no doubt that the relator was afforded a full and fair hearing in the state court on the issue of consent. Its fact finding processes were not rendered inadequate because he was not present at the pre-trial hearing. He was represented there by counsel who actively examined witnesses on his behalf. He himself had not been present at the time his mother is alleged to have consented to the search, and he therefore had no evidence of his own to give on the crucial question of the voluntariness of her consent. He has not pointed to any prejudice, real or fancied, which resulted from his absence, and there is nothing to indicate that he was deprived of access to his counsel in the preparation or conduct of his case. Indeed, it is not even clear that his absence was really involuntary. He was present, moreover, at the subsequent trial, when the motion to suppress was renewed. The possibility of prejudice from his absence at the pre-trial hearing was a matter which I raised (see 230 F.Supp. at p. 278), and relator has now made it clear that it is beyond the scope of his complaint and that he does not wish it considered. In these circumstances I hold that he had a full and fair hearing on the issue of search and seizure.
Although the state court judges made no express findings on the question of the existence and voluntariness of consent by relator's mother the necessary implication of their rulings is that she had voluntarily consented to the search and seizure. I have examined the notes of testimony of both the hearing and the trial and am convinced that these implied findings are reliable. I therefore accept them and see no reason to hold another hearing on the same issue of fact.
In view of the circumstances which I have detailed which indicate that petitioner has no present reason for resorting to the state courts and since I have now disposed of the questions that have been presented, i shall deny his motion for rehearing and shall dismiss finally the petition for habeas corpus which I had earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner has requested the appointment of counsel of represent him on rehearing. Since I have refused a ...