2. The factual question whether the consent of the relator's mother was coerced was not expressly raised by the relator. It is, however, indirectly involved in some of the cases and quotations set out in his petition, which speak of entry accomplished by force, show of force, or illegal threat. Since the petition was prepared without the aid of counsel I shall read it as intending to raise the factual question.
The disputed issue of consent was twice presented in the state court, first at a pre-trial hearing on a petition to suppress the evidence seized by the authorities and again at the subsequent trial on a renewed motion to suppress, made at the close of the Commonwealth's case. If the relator received a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court proceedings and the findings there made are reliable, there is no reason, under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963), for me to hold an evidentiary hearing and redetermine the issue.
I have no doubt that the relator was afforded a full and fair hearing in the state court on the issue of consent. Its fact finding processes were not rendered inadequate because he was not present at the pre-trial hearing. He was represented there by counsel who actively examined witnesses on his behalf. He himself had not been present at the time his mother is alleged to have consented to the search, and he therefore had no evidence of his own to give on the crucial question of the voluntariness of her consent. He has not pointed to any prejudice, real or fancied, which resulted from his absence, and there is nothing to indicate that he was deprived of access to his counsel in the preparation or conduct of his case. Indeed, it is not even clear that his absence was really involuntary. He was present, moreover, at the subsequent trial, when the motion to suppress was renewed. The possibility of prejudice from his absence at the pre-trial hearing was a matter which I raised (see 230 F.Supp. at p. 278), and relator has now made it clear that it is beyond the scope of his complaint and that he does not wish it considered. In these circumstances I hold that he had a full and fair hearing on the issue of search and seizure.
Although the state court judges made no express findings on the question of the existence and voluntariness of consent by relator's mother the necessary implication of their rulings is that she had voluntarily consented to the search and seizure. I have examined the notes of testimony of both the hearing and the trial and am convinced that these implied findings are reliable. I therefore accept them and see no reason to hold another hearing on the same issue of fact.
In view of the circumstances which I have detailed which indicate that petitioner has no present reason for resorting to the state courts and since I have now disposed of the questions that have been presented, i shall deny his motion for rehearing and shall dismiss finally the petition for habeas corpus which I had earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner has requested the appointment of counsel of represent him on rehearing. Since I have refused a rehearing, this request is denied.