tractors and eighty-one trailers. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania there are thirty-six tractors, and seventy-nine trailers; in York, Pennsylvania there are three tractors and thirteen trailers. Thus combining both the Philadelphia and York terminals, the total number of units of tractors and trailers is greater than at the Nitro, West Virginia plaint.
The employees are paid through a central payroll system in York. While there was no specification as to equipment at other terminals and subterminals in Pennsylvania, the record indicates that there were additional terminals or subterminals in Pittsburgh, Reading, Chambersburg, Duncansville and Irwin.
We have been advised by the Court of Appeals of this Circuit:
'In the absence of a simple single test we are forced to analyze our question further and endeavor to pick out as best we can the factor or combination of factors that seem to point to one place as the 'principal' place of business.' Kelley v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 at 853 (3rd Cir. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
Just as the Court of Appeals noted in Kelley, supra, we must note 'the concept may get artificial in some cases as indeed it is in the case before us.' (284 F.2d 850 at 853.) Upon consideration of the 'combination of factors that seem to point to one place as the 'principal' place of business,' I must conclude that Pennsylvania is the principal place of business and thus there is no diversity of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(c). I am bolstered in my opinion by a careful decision of Judge McIlvaine of the Western District of Pennsylvania in Farnen v. Coastal Tanklines, Inc., 195 F.Supp. 777 (W.D.Pa.1961), involving the same defendant corporation in a personal injury claim filed against Coastal. In that case Judge McIlvaine concluded that '* * * under the guide of the court of appeals in the Kelley case, we must conclude that this corporation's business by way of activities is centered in Pennsylvania, and it is these activities which indicate the corporation's principal place of business.' (195 F.Supp. 777, at 778.)
I am aware that plaintiff in this case established a slightly different factual basis than was presented in Farnen, supra; however, I do not think that the different factual base in sufficiently decisive to require a different result.
And now, this 21st day of July, 1964, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.