detailed. The Court's reasoning is equally applicable here (30 P. 532):
'Whenever the knowledge or information of the party charged to have been negligent is a factor in determining such question (of negligence), it is proper, for the purpose of showing such knowledge or information, to show that notice was given to him, and that he was informed of the facts which would constitute negligence * * *. Whether in fact such information was or was not correct, is immaterial for the purpose of determining its admissibility, and hence it is no objection to its admission that it was not given under the sanction of an oath, or that the opposite party had not the opportunity of cross-examining the informant. The truth of the information is a distinct issue, and must be established by competent evidence; but upon the theory that the information was correct the plaintiff in the present instance had the right to show that the defendant had received such information * * *. Such evidence is admitted for the purpose of establishing merely the utterance, of the words, and not their truth.'
See, also, Crespin v. Albuquerque Gas & Electric Co., 39 N.M. 473, 50 P.2d 259 (1935).
The admission of this evidence, in any event, could not have prejudiced defendant, since the purser's knowledge was established by his own testimony at the trial. His letter to the clinic indicated at least a definite suspicion on his part that plaintiff's complaints might be the result of a heart condition. On cross-examination, he testified:
'Q From your own personal knowledge, do you know what the proper course of treatment is for a heart attack? 'A Yes. 'Q What is it? 'A Put the patient in bed and call a doctor. 'Q Do you know what this book says? 'A I have a general idea as to what that book says. 'Q And this book says 'Put the patient in bed and call the doctor,' too, doesn't it? 'A Yes, sir.'
We conclude that there was no error in the admission of the evidence complained of, and that defendant's complaint is without merit.
Accordingly, we make the following
Now, June 22nd, 1964, it is ordered that:
1. Defendant's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment be, and it is, denied.
2. Defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. be, and it is, denied.
3. Defendant's motion for a full or partial new trial or modification of the amount of the judgment be, and it is, granted to the extent that the judgment is reduced from $ 86,900 to $ 61,900.
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