signed it, and Mrs. Sopp was released at least by about 1:30 a.m. The amount of the bail is not indicated in any of the depositions or affidavits, and there is no claim in this case that it was excessive. It appears, however, that Mrs. Sopp was not permitted to use the telephone until at least 10:30 p.m. at which time she called her sister in an attempt to arrange for bail. Plaintiff in this case strongly contends that her arrest followed by incarceration and interrogation from 4:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m. is a violation of her civil rights. Defendants cite Watson v. United States, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 249 F.2d 106, for the principle that an arrested person must be arraigned before a judicial officer as quickly as possible. This case, of course, is authority for that proposition in criminal prosecutions. Failure to promptly arraign very often is the basis for a discharge. But considering the time element involved in the instant case, I do not consider that the time lapse between her arrest at approximately 4:30 p.m. and the arraignment at about 10:30 p.m. was per se a violation of her civil rights. It must be borne in mind that there are no factual averments other than the mere time lapse as showing any such alleged violation of plaintiff's rights.
Under the rule defendants are entitled to summary judgment forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Plaintiff has cited a number of cases, among them, Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, D.C., 209 F.Supp. 757 (1962); Roberts v. Trapnell, D.C., 213 F.Supp. 49 (1962); Wakat v. Harlib, 7 Cir., 253 F.2d 59 (1958), and other cases as supporting the averments in the complaint. I have read those decisions and other decisions, notably, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961), Mueller v. Power, 8 Cir., 203 F.2d 797 (1953); Geach v. Moynahan, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 714 (1953); and Hornsby v. Allen, 5 Cir., 236 F.2d 605 (1964). It should be observed that in reading decisions with respect to so-called civil rights cases the facts in each case are usually unique. Many persons are arrested without warrants. It is a plain abuse of authority imposed on the officers. I do not find the factual situation in the instant case anywise comparable to those decisions which support civil rights cases.
It seems to this Court to be beyond dispute but that these defendants acted in strict accordance with the requirements of the law in investigation and in causing the warrant to issue and the arrest of the plaintiff and her detention under bail. Defendant Nowak has signed the information and tells why he signed it and the basis on which he made the affidavit. The then Assistant District Attorney advised the prosecution after conferring at least twice with the detectives of the plaintiff's rights. In the complaint there are no averments of fact which would warrant any conclusion but that Mrs. Sopp was treated while under arrest and in the hands of the officers with the same consideration as is given any other person arrested. There is nothing in the affidavits and depositions to show that any of the defendants abused their authority under color of law. There was no concerted action on their part to disregard the plain requirements of any law. It is apparent from the affidavits that each was concerned over the seriousness of the offense with which the plaintiff was to be charged and acted guardedly by and after consultation with each other, and their actions were guided by what they considered to be credible evidence. Of course, the prosecution was ill-founded but that is hindsight so far as the instant case is concerned. The defendants made a judgment based upon facts and information which they possessed and which at the time appeared credible. Examining this situation from the point of view of the law as the writer of this opinion understands it, the defendants could not have done otherwise considering the circumstances confronting them, and as the prosecution against plaintiff turned out ill-founded, it seems to this Court that this civil action is equally ill-founded and is not supported by federal law. The respective Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss are granted.
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