King Conservation Center. (Hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 'Center' or the 'King Center.')
The acceptance and occupation of these rooms did not change his salary and had no relation to the work he had previously been doing for the City, nor did it later, except incidentally, have any relation to his primary employment with the City of Pittsburgh, Department of Parks and Recreation. Acceptance of the offer was completely voluntary on his part. As part of the arrangement, he was expected to, and did, perform certain maintenance work about or on the property, as well as keeping it free from vandalism and damage.
The plaintiff employee of the City in its Department of Parks and Recreation was not required to live on the premises which is the subject of the tax litigation as a condition of his regular, normal employment, and if he elected to move out, as he has in reality since done, his employment was in no way effected, nor involved, nor were his services or salary effected in any way whatsoever.
Since living at the city-owned King Conservation and Cultural Center was not required as a condition of his regular, normal employment with the City, he does not qualify for an exclusion under § 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Implicit in taxpayer's position is an alternative contention that this lodging was part of a separate job as an overseer or caretaker of the King Center, and that in this job all the requirements of § 119 of the Code were met. There is no merit to this 'second job' argument. This lodging was not something additional which had to be accepted as a condition of the 'caretaker' job or employment but, rather, was, if anything, the payment for his presence there and whatever duties he performed about the premises. It was nothing more than salary in kind.
The Court cannot read § 119 as applying to such a situation and, therefore, must determine that the value of the house is taxable to the taxpayers.
Since plaintiffs do not dispute that the $ 1,200.00 assessed by the Internal Revenue Service was the rental value of the King Center apartment occupied by the taxpayers, and since said rental value is taxable, judgment will be entered for the defendant.
This Opinion shall constitute the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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