Appeals, No. 294, Oct. T., 1963, from order of Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, June T., 1963, No. 3, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. One 1956 Oldsmobile Sedan (Oliver O. Stoner); and No. 296, Oct. T., 1963, from order of Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, June T., 1963, No. 4, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. One 1956 Lincoln Sedan (William S. Diggs). Orders affirmed.
J. Leonard Langan, Assistant Attorney General, with him I. Harry Checchio, Special Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Shannon, Assistant Attorney General, and Walter E. Alessandroni, Attorney General, for Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, appellant.
No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellees.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 572]
These two appeals were taken by the Commonwealth from the dismissal by the lower court of petitions for forfeiture of automobiles filed pursuant to Article VI of the Liquor Code of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. § 6-601 et seq.
The automobiles had been used to transport liquor in violation of the Liquor Code. For a time the forfeiture of an automobile in a case like this was mandatory, but since the amendment of April 20, 1956, P.L.
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 573]
(1955) 1508, to section 602(e) of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 6-602(e), the forfeiture is subject to the discretion of the quarter sessions court. Commonwealth v. One 1957 Chewrolet Sedan, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 182, 183, 155 A.2d 438 (1959).
In the cases before us, the lower court dismissed the petitions to forfeit after the Commonwealth presented its case and without hearing the reputed owner or intervenor. The facts could have been more fully developed, but from the Commonwealth's evidence concerning the nature of the violation, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in refusing to forfeit the vehicles. Commonwealth v. One 1959 Chevrolet Impala Coupe (Thomas), 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 145, 149, 150, 191 A.2d 717 (1963). All the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was heard, so it has no standing to complain that the reputed owner and intervenor were not heard. If they had been heard and their evidence had supported their pleadings, the court would have had additional reasons to dismiss the Commonwealth's petitions.