even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.'
'We think this obligation -- or residual power -- to grant all appropriate relief, whether or not it is demanded, is confirmatory of a jurisdiction which cannot be divested by the artifice of the plaintiff in limiting its claim to the single form of relief which § 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act presently precludes.' American Dredging Company v. Local 25, etc., et al., supra, p. 989 of 224 F.Supp.
That this question of jurisdiction is not free of doubt cannot be gainsaid by any serious student of the law. We do not intend to engage in any elaborate discussion of various nuances and meanings attributable to the word 'jurisdiction.' All we hold by this decision is that removal may be sustained and an application to remand denied 'even if removal is effected only to be followed by a grantable motion to dismiss on the ground that though the cause is classifiable as a 301(a) suit, Norris-La Guardia forbids the award of the injunction sought.' Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Teamsters, Bakery Drivers Union Local 802, 228 F.Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y.1963).
From our 'Findings of Fact' it is obvious that the controversial issue giving rise to the problem before us has been litigated in various forums within and without the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Issues involving the collective bargaining agreement, the right to strike, peaceful picketing and other issues have been litigated in counties other than Chester County in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, more particularly, in the States of New Jersey and Delaware, whose laws in the labor relations field, to the best of our knowledge, are not consistent with the laws of Pennsylvania.
While we consider it of little importance in determining the issue now before us, from the briefs and arguments both the plaintiff and the defendant agree that no prior notice of the petition for the restraining order was given to defendant by plaintiff prior to its presentment to the Court of Chester County. Both plaintiff and defendant argue that the effect of the restraining order issued by the Court of Chester County carries beyond the jurisdiction of that County and affects the activities of defendant, its agents, servants and employees not only in other counties in Pennsylvania but in states other than Pennsylvania.
We are not convinced that the order entered by the Court of Chester County intended or compelled such a result, but the fact remains that the parties to this controversy agree that it does. No notice was given by plaintiff to defendant until after the restraining order had been issued. The nature of this procedure in our opinion runs contrary to protecting 'concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.' Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, supra, p. 202 of 370 U.S., p. 1333 of 82 S. Ct., 8 L. Ed. 2d 440.
While admittedly the posture of this case causes irreparable injury to all parties concerned and further delay in ultimate determination of the issue may cause hardship to both plaintiff and defendant we cannot conclude otherwise than that the original issue raised presents a question that must be determined initially by the Federal Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. We have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter under 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
2. The plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED.
AND NOW, this 11th day of March, 1964, the plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.