1947, and, further, that the plaintiff has no standing to seek interlocutory relief since Young has his own collective bargaining agreement dated May 27, 1963 with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters before Young became a party to the Central Pennsylvania Steel Haul and Special Commodities Agreement on August 1, 1963.
On January 10, 1964, we issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the defendants from proceeding with a private arbitration hearing scheduled for January 13, 1964. This hearing was to consider the reinstatement of Robert Feher, an employee of Young, who had previously been ordered reinstated by the Joint Local City Steel Grievance Committee on November 7, 1963.
Thereafter, we held a hearing on January 27, 1964, to consider the propriety of the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. No testimony was taken as the facts were not disputed. Upon agreement of the parties we continued the restraining order until February 20, 1964.
The plaintiff does not seek damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, but instead requests this Court to restrain the defendants from rearbitrating a grievance which had been decided pursuant to the procedures contained in the Central Pennsylvania Steel Haul and Special Commodities Agreement. Also, the plaintiff demands that the Court enforce the decision of the Committee as a final, binding judgment.
A suit to enforce compliance with an arbitration award rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is within the ambit of Section 301(a). Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957). This Court has jurisdiction of such a suit provided the award is final and binding under the collective bargaining agreement. General Drivers, etc., Local Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 83 S. Ct. 789, 9 L. Ed. 2d 918 (1963). Such enforcement may take the form of an injunction if this will effectively insure compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at p. 458, 77 S. Ct. at pp. 918-919, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972, citing Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892, 76 S. Ct. 152, 100 L. Ed. 785 (1955).
Multi-employer agreements similar to the contract in this case are intended to promote the common economic interests of the parties and insure industrial harmony for the period covered by the contract.
Such a purpose is in full accord with the intent of the L.M.R.A. of 1947. This multi-employer Agreement would be meaningless and utter chaos would occur if each carrier could resort to private arbitration merely because it received an adverse decision under the procedures outlined in the contract. The common economic interests shared by the parties to the Central Pennsylvania Steel Haul and Special Commodities Agreement amply qualify the plaintiff to bring this action on their behalf to preserve those interests.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. We have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.
2. The arbitration award of November 7, 1963 is a final, binding judgment which is enforceable by the Court.
3. Irreparable harm will result to the plaintiff if Young is allowed to ignore this binding judgment and rearbitrate the grievance concerning Robert Feher.
4. The stability of labor relations in a large segment of the trucking industry will be undermined if Young persists in violating the multi-employer agreement.
5. The defendant Young was a party to and bound by all the terms of the Central Pennsylvania Steel Haul and Special Commodities Agreement.
6. The defendant Local Union No. 773 is likewise bound by all the terms of the Central Pennsylvania Steel Haul and Special Commodities Agreement.
7. Neither of the defendants can unilaterally change or vary the provisions of the aforesaid Agreement without the consent of all parties thereto.
8. The defendant Young by executing the multi-employer Agreement specifically recognized the Association as its agent.
9. The plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction.
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