to contest further issues which have been heard and decided with the thought that a previous conclusion can be shown to be untrue and a later one true to the facts.'
And again at page 617 of 167 F.2d:
'If an issue is raised and the party who has the burden fails in his proof and the issue is decided against him, he is just as much bound by collateral estoppel as though he had presented a barrel of testimony. A man cannot offer his cake and expect to keep it in litigation any more than anywhere else.'
Since no appeal was taken by Basista from the judgment against him in the Quarter Sessions Court, it is interesting to note how the Court of Appeals considered this similar situation in the Silliman case. At page 618 of 167 F.2d:
'The Government took no appeal. Therefore, whether the conclusion of the learned Surrogate was right or wrong is not now a question which is open to litigation.'
It would seem that perhaps this discussion would relate only to civil actions since it is a general rule of evidence that records in criminal cases are not admissible in evidence in civil cases although both grow out of the same facts. Chantango v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 481, 31 S. Ct. 34, 54 L. Ed. 1116 (1910). However, evidence as to a prior criminal conviction may be admissible in certain situations where the same factual issues are involved. Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816, 818, 819 (C.A.7, 1942); Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 187 U.S. 362, 23 S. Ct. 139, 47 L. Ed. 216 (1902). In any event, the general rule is not applicable in this case because the parties themselves have mutually stood upon the former criminal proceedings, in whole or in part, as suited their respective purposes. Accordingly, the parties themselves have made the determination of the assault and battery in the Quarter Sessions Court relevant in this present action.
As I have already indicated, in order for the plaintiff to succeed in a claim for damages in a state court, Basista would first have to establish some vindication as to the prior criminal proceedings either by the failure of the police to fully prosecute against him or by a judgment of the court of not guilty. Since there was a judgment of guilty charged to Basista, there would have been no recovery in a state court. Now the question lies under all these circumstances can there be a recovery in a federal court based upon the same factual issues already resolved to judgment in the state court?
I am mindful of the concluding words of Judge Goodrich in the Silliman case, supra, at pages 620 and 621 of 167 F.2d:
'The full faith and credit clause 'compels that controversies be settled so that where a state court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter the judgment controls in other states to the same extent as it does in the state where rendered.' * * * And, although judicial proceedings in the Federal Courts were not explicitly included within the language of the Constitution, it has been held by the Supreme Court that full faith and credit must be afforded to a state court's judgment when brought into relevancy in a Federal tribunal.'
The exercise of federal jurisdiction to interfere with proceedings of the state government charged with prosecution and punishment of offenders is to be exercised with the greatest of care and is to be exerted only in exceptional cases involving such an emergency or urgency as necessitates action to prevent irreparable injury. Egan v. City of Aurora, supra.
The burden of this plaintiff in this court under these circumstances, and for the purpose of maintaining a proper balance between the state and federal governments, was to first show a deficiency or a disadvantage withheld by which he was handicapped, obstructed or judicially prejudiced in the state court. None of these appear here and this federal court ought not to be used as a vehicle without good cause first being shown that it was a necessary vehicle to the complainants not used for ulterior purposes or in conflict with the principles upon which good government must rest. It was not proven in the evidence of this case that the state court failed to properly adjudicate the facts.
While it is conceivable that the state judicial processes deprived the plaintiff of his federally protected rights, yet to sustain an action under the Civil Rights Act, the state court proceedings must have been a nullity, or with a purpose of depriving a person of his rights. To hold otherwise, would open the door to aggrieved state litigants and set up the federal courts as the arbiter of the correctness of every state decision. Bottone v. Lindsley (C.A.10, 1948), 170 F.2d 705; Johnson v. Stone, (C.A.Ill., 1959), 268 F.2d 803.
Just as we have the right to expect lawful performance from our peace officers, so too, courts of competent jurisdiction have the right to have their lawful judgments respected.
From all of the evidence presented in this case, I am not convinced that the plaintiff proved anything more than an action based on personal animosity, and not on any violation of federally protected rights. I am of the opinion that the jury was not adequately instructed and this was error on my part, for which reason, in any event, a new trial should be allowed. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff's remedy for any action he may have, or have had, is or was in the state courts.
The motion of the defendant for a directed verdict will be granted, without prejudice, or, in the alternative, a new trial.