and simultaneously amended its complaint to add the following paragraph to the prayer for relief:
'Plaintiff, by this Complaint, solely seeks injunctive relief and Plaintiff expressly foregoes and releases in this suit and for the purposes of this suit alone, any claim or demand for damages or money judgment, which this Court may order under its power and authority incidental to its equitable jurisdiction.'
Upon denial, after hearing, of its 'renewed' motion to remand, plaintiff moved to certify the question of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This motion, too, was denied. Plaintiff then moved for preliminary injunction and a hearing was had at the conclusion of which defendants moved for dismissal of the motion for preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff contends that, since the complaint, as now amended, seeks injunctive relief only, and expressly disclaims any other type of relief in this action, this Court lacks jurisdiction of the action under § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which, with exceptions not here material, bars Federal Courts from issuing injunctions 'in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute.'
We disagree. This Court has jurisdiction of the action, in our view, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a):
'Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.'
Plaintiff is an employer, and defendant Union is a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, as those terms are defined in the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 152. The suit is one for violation of a contract between the plaintiff employer and defendant labor organization. This Court's jurisdiction seems clear.
We think plaintiff's argument fails to distinguish between this Court's jurisdiction and its power to grant the relief demanded. 'As frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier to granting plaintiff's claim is cast in terms of an exception to jurisdiction of subject matter.' Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575, 73 S. Ct. 921, 924, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953). The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and other matters with which it often is confused is pointed out in 21 C.J.S. Courts § 35, p. 45:
'Jurisdiction of the subject matter is essential in every case. Such jurisdiction the court acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses inherently by its constitution; and it is not dependent on the existence of a good cause of action in plaintiff in a cause pending before the court; nor upon the sufficiency of the bill or complaint, the validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, or plaintiff's right to the relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings, or the correctness of the decision rendered.' (emphasis supplied).
In our view, this Court has jurisdiction, notwithstanding that injunctive relief is now the sole relief demanded. Moreover, this Court unquestionably had jurisdiction, as plaintiff tacitly concedes, to grant the 'other appropriate releif' demanded in the original complaint. We do not believe that plaintiff could, by amendment or other means, deprive this Court of jurisdiction acquired through removal. In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, p. 292, 58 S. Ct. 586, p. 592, 82 L. Ed. 845 (1938), a closely analogous case, it was held:
'And though, as here, the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount, this does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.'
We note further Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which, in relevant part, provides:
'Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.'
We think this obligation -- or residual power -- to grant all appropriate relief, whether or not it is demanded, is confirmatory of a jurisdiction which cannot be divested by the artifice of the plaintiff in limiting its claim to the single form of relief which § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act presently precludes.
We conclude, therefore, that this Court does have jurisdiction of this action for violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.
On the merits of the pending motion, we are, of course, without power to grant injunctive relief because of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, since this is a 'case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,' within the meaning of the act. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S. Ct. 1328, 8 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1962).
Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction will, therefore, be denied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.
2. The collective bargaining agreements between the parties constitute valid and subsisting contracts.
3. Defendants, or some of them, violated the contracts by engaging in a concerted work stoppage, and have persisted and do persist in such violation.
4. This case involves or grows out of a labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104.
5. This Court is without power, under § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, to issue an injunction restraining defendants' concerted work stoppage.
6. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied.