have had. He cannot now assign as a deprivation of constitutional rights that which he himself brought about. The sentence on No. 58, January Sessions, 1961, was therefore valid.
We turn now to relator's claim that he was forcibly abducted from New York and brought to Bucks County for arraignment, plea and sentence. Again, Pennsylvania holdings would seem to indicate that resort to Pennsylvania courts on this ground would be fruitless. Commonwealth ex rel. Howard v. Claudy, 172 Pa.Super. 574, 579, 93 A.2d 906 (1953). In Commonwealth ex rel. Rushkowski v. Burke, 171 Pa.Super. 1, at page 7, 89 A.2d 899, at page 902, (1952), the court said:
'* * * The manner of his return to Pennsylvania would not establish 'probable cause to be delivered' from his present detention. Obviously the means employed to return him to this state did not relate to the restraint from which he seeks to be delivered, and consequently his return to this state, even if unlawful, would not make his present imprisonment illegal or in violation of due process. * * *'
This has been the law of Pennsylvania at least since Dow's case, 18 Pa. 37 (1851). However, while apparently it would be fruitless for relator to seek relief from the state courts on this ground, he is just as badly off here. The Constitution is not concerned with how a criminal defendant was brought within a court's jurisdiction. In Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952), the relator in a habeas corpus case alleged that while he was living in Illinois, officers from Michigan forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to Michigan where he was tried. He claimed that his trial under such circumstances violated his constitutional rights. In holding that the District Court properly denied the writ without a hearing, Mr. Justice Black said, 342 U.S. at page 522, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541:
'* * * This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225 (30 L. Ed. 421), that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will. * * *'
See also: Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283 (1888); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 13 S. Ct. 40, 36 L. Ed. 934 (1892); In Re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 17 S. Ct. 735, 42 L. Ed. 103 (1897); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 L.E. 148 (1906); notes in 27 Ind.L.J. 292 (1952) and 27 Notre Dame Law 280 (1952).
The final matter is the relator's contention that he was uncounseled at the parole violation hearing of August 3, 1962. This proceeding was post-Gideon, and, so far as we can discover, no Pennsylvania court has considered the problem of whether the Constitution requires representation by counsel at a parole violation hearing, in this or in any other case. Until the matter has been passed on by the State and until relator has exhausted state remedies on this ground, we are not free to consider it.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied. We express our thanks to Alex Bonavitacola, Esquire, who has ably, energetically and without recompense presented relator's case.