Appeal, No. 195, Oct. T., 1963, from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia County, June T., 1957, No. 6819, in equity, in case of The Daniel B. Van Campen Corporation v. Building and Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity et al. Order affirmed.
Frederick C. Fiechter, Jr., for appellant.
Ellis A. Horwitz, Assistant City Solicitor, James L. Stern, Second Deputy City Solicitor, Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., Deputy City Solicitor, and Edward G. Bauer, Jr., City Solicitor, for City of Philadelphia, appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ. (watkins, J., absent).
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 119]
OPINION BY MONTGOMERY, J.
This case is before us for the second time.*fn1 However, our present consideration of it is limited to the question of whether the complaint sufficiently sets forth a cause of action against the City of Philadelphia alone for damages sustained by the plaintiff-appellant, which were occasioned by the stoppage of work being done by plaintiff for the City.
The lower court sustained preliminary objections to the complaint, which were in the nature of a demurrer,
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 120]
and dismissed the bill. This appeal was taken from that action.
This action was commenced in equity for the purpose of enjoining the picketing of the construction site by some of the defendants, and for damages from all of the defendants. At a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, an order was made by Judge REIMEL of the court below suspending the picketing. It would now appear that plaintiff has abandoned its claim for damages except against the City, since that is the only one being pressed.
Plaintiff contends that the City is liable to it for expenditures made by it for the employment of a watchman to protect the project during the time the work was stopped because of the picketing. No consequential damages of any kind are claimed. Plaintiff's theory of its claim as expressed in its brief is that it was the victim of an illegal secondary boycott and that the City was liable "when [it] a City of the First Class violated a condition of cooperation with its general contractor by failing to convene its labor arbitration machinery or take any legal steps to remove that boycott (whether it was organizational or for better working conditions) on the ground the City was 'helpless' even though the contract relieved against an act of government and general strikes?"
Plaintiff, a general contractor, engaged only subcontractors who employed union labor. However, there were separate prime contractors for parts of the work. C. Trauss was the prime contractor for the electrical work. Its employes were unorganized. Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that there was no existing labor dispute but that ...