Appeals, Nos. 105 and 106, Oct. T., 1963, from judgment of County Court of Philadelphia, June T., 1961, No. 1784-D, in case of Caroline Smith et vir v. Philadelphia Transportation Company et al. Judgment affirmed.
James D. McCrudden, for appellant.
David H. Kubert, for appellee, submitted a brief.
George P. Williams, III, with him Schnader, Harrisom, Segal & Lewis, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 279]
The defendant has appealed from a refusal of the court below to enter judgment n.o.v. against the additional defendant, Mrs. Jurewicz, whose car collided with the defendant's bus in an intersection. Its contention is that as she was admittedly negligent and the negligence of the bus operator was not a superseding cause, her negligence was a proximate cause of the passenger's
[ 202 Pa. Super. Page 280]
injury. Actually the situation raises neither the issue of superseding cause or proximate cause. The real question is whether the negligence of the additional defendant was a cause in fact of the accident. Relying upon the case of Ginsburg v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 355 Pa. 193, 49 A.2d 367 (1946), the court below, in effect, held that it was not. We agree.
The additional defendant testified that she entered the intersection from the north and, relying upon a green traffic light, maintained her speed of about twenty-five miles per hour but did not look for traffic on the cross street before entering the intersection. Under such circumstances, her failure to look was negligent as a matter of law. Grande v. Wooleyhan Transport Company, 353 Pa. 535, 46 A.2d 241 (1946). The issue is whether this negligence was a cause of the accident.
The determination of whether casual connection exists is for the jury, if there is any substantial evidence of such connection. Bearing in mind that on appeal from the refusal of a motion for judgment n.o.v., we must construe the evidence most favorably to the party who obtained the verdict, the jury's verdict is clearly justified. From the testimony the jury could have found that when Mrs. Jurewicz entered the intersection the P.T.C. bus was stopped either to discharge or load passengers; that she had the green light and would have been justified, if she had looked before entering the intersection, in assuming that the bus would not start until she had cleared the intersection; that the bus driver started immediately after discharging or loading his passengers, while the light was still red or amber for him and Mrs. Jurewicz was in the ...