disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated and there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty. Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308, 314 (3d Cir., 1940). The same rule applies 'when a new trial is sought on the theory of an inadequate verdict.' Wooley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 281 F.2d 78, 80 (3d Cir., 1960).
Plaintiff argues that her 'out-of-pocket' expenses exceeded.$ 1000.00, and that the award for pain, suffering, and inconvenience was necessarily less than $ 400.00. However, an examination of the evidence discloses that the jury may not have awarded the total of her claimed medical expenses.
The extensive physiotherapy treatment for her arm condition, administered by three doctors, produced no beneficial results to the plaintiff. She controls her alleged pain by medication. After her cuts, bruises, and contusions cleared up, Miss Marshall seems to have led a normal life. Whether her doctors rendered necessary services to her and charged her fair and reasonable prices therefor, like the award for pain, suffering, and inconvenience, were questions peculiarly within the jury's province. "The trier of fact is at liberty within bounds of reason to reject entirely the uncontradicted testimony of a witness which does not produce conviction in his mind of the witness' testimony.' The right of the trier of the fact to reject oral testimony seems particularly appropriate when the testimony is composed of opinions.' Wooley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, spura, 281 F.2d at p. 80.
There were some obvious weaknesses in the evidence concerning plaintiff's medical expenses. She claimed $ 200.00 for drugs; the receipts she produced amounted to only $ 27.89. Lamely she stated: 'After three years it got ridiculous * * * to ask for a receipt.' The evidence discloses that she only asked for receipts for seven months, and during those seven months expended for drugs $ 27.89. At that rate, her expenses to the time of trial for drugs would be $ 4.00 per month, and the jury justifiably could have given her $ 128.00 instead of $ 200.00. One of her doctors mailed an unitemized bill in the sum of $ 265.00 to plaintiff's attorney. The evidence shows that he rendered 33 treatments at.$ 7.00 per treatment, which would amount to $ 231.00; the remainder of $ 34.00 apparently was for correspondence and advice given over the telephone. The jury could have concluded that this doctor's bill in excess of $ 197.00 was not fair and reasonable, especially in view of the ineffective services rendered. Another of her doctors submitted an unitemized bill for $ 280.00. The evidence discloses that he treated her about 33 times. Plaintiff testified that on one visit to this doctor for another injury, he charged her $ 4.00. The jury could well have concluded that the fair and reasonable bill for these ineffective treatments was around $ 132.00 instead of $ 280.00.
If the jury had deducted these possible differences in the claim for drugs and medical bills, that award would have been around $ 600.00, and the remainder of around $ 800.00 would have been the amount awarded for pain, suffering, inconvenience, and damage to her clothes
instead of something less than $ 400.00. The foregoing examples of evidentiary weakness should not be construed to foreclose the possibility that the jury found the plaintiff's claims for medical expenses were exaggerated and allowed even less than indicated above.
It is the province of the jury to appraise the worth of the testimony relating to the reasonable value of the medical services and to accept or reject the estimates given by the doctors. McCluskey v. Poloha, 194 Pa.Super. 286, 166 A.2d 334 (1960). Of course, we realize that there is now no way of telling what the jury actually did, but the foregoing analysis of the evidence indicates that the verdict does bear an arguable resemblance to the proven damages and that it was not capricious or actuated by improper motives or a reckless disregard of the evidence. In this case we do not think the court should substitute its judgment for that of the jury's. See the principles restated by Judge Stewart, late of this court, in Zellem v. Herring, 102 F.Supp. 105 (W.D.Pa.1952).
An appropriate order will be entered.