such liability is pending at the time of, or commenced within one year after the enactment of this Act.'
The repealing Act of 1955, phrased as it is in broad terms, is a general statute using broad generic terms as, 'educational,' 'public health,' 'research', while the Act of 1946 referred only to 'the teaching and training of cadet-midshipmen', unquestionably special in its format, content and purpose.
It is well settled law with relation to statutory construction that a later general statute will not be held to repeal by implication a prior special statute. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030 (1883); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bilder, 3 Cir., 289 F.2d 291, 303 (1961); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Rivera's Estate et al., 2 Cir., 214 F.2d 60, 62 (1954).
In Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87-88, 22 S. Ct. 582, 583, 46 L. Ed. 816 (1902), the Court held:
'It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. In other words, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general -- the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special -- the fact that the one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, and the general will not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the special. * * *'
In addition thereto, the Act of August 7, 1946 (60 Stat. 884) was expressly repealed by the Act of October 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 704). Of course, this repeal does not affect the right of the United States to maintain this action. Under 1 U.S.C. § 109 the repeal of a statute does not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute unless the repealing act so expressly provides, and the repealed statute shall be treated as still in effect for the purpose of sustaining any proper action for enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.
Certainly the conditions imposed on the use of the property donated to defendant were never expressly repealed or abrogated by the donor.
From the fact that the Act of 1946 was expressly repealed four years prior to the enactment of the Act of 1955, it would follow that the Congress could not have had the Act of 1946 in mind when considering the Act of 1955. In addition thereto, evidence of the Congressional state of mind is found in the report of the hearings on the bill before the Special Committee on Donable Property of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 1st Session, February 15, 1955. At the opening of the hearing a list was made of the various public laws which would be affected by the bill and the Act of 1946 was not included in the list.
I am of the opinion that the Congress when considering the enactment of the Act of 1955 never intended its provisions to apply to property transferred pursuant to the authorization granted by the Act of 1946, that Act ceased to exist five years prior thereto.
Finally, defendant's disposal of the property in question occurred prior to the Act of 1955.
Motion of defendant for summary judgment will be denied.
At the present time there are not sufficient admitted facts before the Court upon which the Court would be justified in acting on cross-motion of plaintiff for summary judgment; accordingly said motion will be denied.
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