action now, we are told that it may become unlikely, or perhaps impossible to collect the judgment.
Rather than making assumptions not warranted by the present record and leaving aside the question of whether defendants' salaries are 'union funds', I prefer granting the relief sought on the second ground.
In that regard, it is clear that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, P.L. 86-257, 29 U.S.C. 401, permits duly established representatives of a minority of a union, to enforce rights of the union as a whole despite the wishes of the majority. No strain is placed on the law of this case by applying this basic proposition to require the Union to use its best efforts and all means available to collect the judgment. It has been determined that money is owed by employees to the employer. The fact that they are officers is of no consequence.
There is no execution involved here. This is merely an injunction in aid of collection based upon the right of a judgment creditor to set off claims owed it by the judgment debtor. The Union chooses to neglect this right, as it sought to disregard its rights in the first place by wrongfully paying counsel fees for defendants.
This Court must secure and protect the benefits of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, supra, by fashioning suitable law in accordance with the intent of Congress. See the Opinion of my Brother Clary, Chief Judge, in this very case, D.C., 182 F.Supp. 608 at page 617. Granting the relief sought is the proper way to secure and protect plaintiffs' rights.
Since collection of the judgment of $ 24,921.41 is what is sought, defendant-intervenor will be allowed to accept a bond with surety sufficient to secure payment of judgment, interest and costs by defendants; otherwise a mandatory injunction will issue forthwith and remain in full force and effect until the judgment is satisfied. A bond in the sum of $ 30,000.00 approved by this Court will be deemed sufficient to secure the payment of judgment, interest and costs.
A form of order may be submitted by plaintiffs.
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