petitioned to move by those having rights under the Act. Int. Commerce Commission v. United States of America ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 484, 32 S. Ct. 556, 56 L. Ed. 849, 1912.
The Congress has delegated regulatory powers to the Commission under which it has regulated transportation, etc., since 1887. In courts of law as well as in administrative agencies decided matters become res judicata. Thereafter, when issues are raised which have been the subject of prior final decisions they may be treated in what would appear to be summary fashion. Due process of law does not require an administrative body any more than a court to retry issues which have been once decided. To compel the Commission to retain its files on every tariff and call a hearing thereon irrespective of whether it is based on a certificate would simply be senseless and bog the Commission down in useless time consuming effort. This court agrees with the Commission that Dillner Tariff MF-16 is an attempt to secure authority to haul firebrick and ferrous alloys. What the Commission denied cannot be secured by rearranging language in the hope that in one way or another the previously denied authority will be approved.
No doubt, because of the wording of Section 317, the precise question decided here has not been often the subject of litigation before a court. Research has failed to disclose an exact parallel court decision but nevertheless the Commission has asserted in prior cases the power which is used here. In Acme Fast Freight v. United States, 30 F.Supp. 968, 974 (S.D.N.Y.1940), the court referred to the language in Section 217(a) in saying that a tariff
'* * * may be rejected by the Commission when they are 'not in consonance with this section."
When the case was before the Commission, 17 MCC 549 (1939), in speaking of a tariff which is not in consonance, etc., the Commission said:
'If they are not required by statute to be filed, we are not bound to accept them, and if we should accept them upon a misapprehension, or inadvertently without examination or without determination as to whether they are proper subjects for filing, we may later reject them and strike them from our files.'
But the case is not entirely a binding precedent because the record shows that in fact hearings were held. It should be noticed that the decision of the Commission was afterward affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 309 U.S. 638, 60 S. Ct. 810, 84 L. Ed. 993, October Term, 1939, and there is no language in the Supreme Court's opinion which could be in any way construed as critical of the language of the Commission.
In the briefs of counsel, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 76 S. Ct. 373, 100 L. Ed. 373, 1956 is cited. In this case the issue involved the interpretation of the Federal Power Commission's authority under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. However, as counsel say, the Natural Gas Act was modeled under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. See Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 62 S. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 1037, 1942. The Supreme Court in the Mobile case used language which this court believes is applicable to the instant decision when it says, 350 U.S. p. 347, 76 S. Ct. p. 382:
'There can be no doubt of the authority of the Commission to reject the unauthorized filing under its general powers to issue orders 'necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act,' 16, and its failure to do so and its order 'permitting' the new rates to become effective were in error.'
Likewise, the Interstate Commerce Commission, it seems to us was empowered to issue the Order it did in the instant case under its general powers to make all necessary orders, to administer, execute and enforce all provisions of the Interstate Act. Section 204(a)(6) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 304(a)(6).
And Now, this 8th day of February, 1963, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing opinion, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in its favor is denied.
And Further, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment against plaintiff, W. J. Dillner Transfer Company, and in favor of the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, defendants.