against the administrator or trustee of the fund. Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of defendants have any connection with or control over either the welfare funds or records pertaining thereto. Plaintiffs' third claim is defective in this respect and will be dismissed.
In their fourth claim, plaintiffs allege that the trusteeship over Helpers Local 42 is no longer necessary. Defendants contend that as a prerequisite to judicially asserting this claim plaintiffs must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under § 304(a) LMRDA (29 U.S.C.A. § 464(a)). There is a diversity of opinion among the District Courts on this question. Defendants have cited in support of their position, Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F.Supp. 300 D.C.S.D.Cal.1960); and Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F.Supp. 456 (D.C.D.N.J.1960). A contrary view is expressed in Vars v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, Etc., 204 F.Supp. 245 (D.C.D.Conn.1962) and Executive Board Local Union No. 28 IBEW v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 184 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.D.Md.1960). The latter view is more persuasive, and I hold that filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor is not a prerequisite to bringing a civil action. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' fourth claim, therefore, will be denied.
Plaintiffs allege in their fifth claim and in subdivision (c) of the second claim (paragraph 11(c)) that, despite repeated requests, defendants have refused to furnish plaintiffs with copies of the union's constitution, bylaws and labor agreements. Section 104 LMRAD (29 U.S.C.A. § 414) gives union members the right, upon request, to obtain copies of collective bargaining agreements. That section also states that 210 (29 U.S.C.A. § 440) '* * * shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.' Section 210 § LMRDA provides:
'Whenever it shall appear that any person has violated or is about to violate any of the provisions of this title, the Secretary may bring a civil action for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action may be brought in the district court of the United States where the violation occurred or, at the option of the parties, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.'
Defendants insist that 210 is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs. I disagree. Section 104 is contained in Title I LMRDA (29 U.S.C.A. Subchapter II, § 411 et seq.) and is part of the 'Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations.' The 'rights' contained in Title I are expressly enforceable in a civil action brought by 'any person whose rights * * * have been infringed * * *' LMRDA § 102 (29 U.S.C.A. § 412). On the other hand, § 210 is part of Title II LMRDA (29 U.S.C.A. Subchapter III, § 431 et seq.) which requires 'Reporting by Labor Organizations, Officers and Employees of Labor Organizations, and Employers.' The sections under this Title require reports to be filed with the Secretary of Labor, and § 210 gives the Secretary of Labor the power to enforce those requirements by court proceedings. Section 104 deals with information required to be furnished to union members. Vesting in such members a private right to enforce that requirement is in no way incompatible with, and indeed, is supplemented by the existence of a similar right in the Secretary. Section 210 is nowhere expressly made the exclusive procedure for enforcing § 104, instead the scheme of the legislation and the language of the sections in question support the view that 210 is a supplemental remedy.
In contrast to the express requirements of § 104 (29 U.S.C.A. § 414) that a labor union supply copies of labor agreements upon request to its members, there is no similar provision covering union constitutions and bylaws. Since Congress was very specific in requiring that certain information, e.g. financial data, LMRDA § 201(c) (29 U.S.C.A. § 431(c)), labor agreements, 104 (29 U.S.C.A. § 414), etc., be made available to union members, I cannot assume that the failure to include reference to constitution and bylaws was inadvertent. Those parts of plaintiffs' fifth claim and paragraph 11(c) of the second claim which relate to refusal to furnish copies of constitution and bylaws will be dismissed.
Plaintiffs suggested, at oral argument, that the failure to furnish copies of the constitution and bylaws excuses exhaustion of intra-union remedies because without these documents plaintiffs were unable to discover whether there were any intra-union remedies available to them. Although the complaint itself contradicts this position (by express reference to a constitutional provision and by alleging that some of plaintiffs were former officers who presumably were familiar with the union constitution, bylaws and the appellate procedure), the failure to supply copies of the documents in question does not support an independent cause of action under LMRDA. Instead, if properly placed before the Court at the appropriate time, it is a factor to be considered when the exhaustion of remedies issue is finally determined.
The motion to dismiss the complaint against John J. Conway will also be denied. Paragraph 5 of the complaint identifies him as an officer of the International and paragraphs 11(c) and 18 contain allegations against, inter alia, individual defendants, of whom Conway is one. Whether the allegations against Conway are true and whether plaintiffs may, therefore, have rights and remedies against him must await the development of the evidence at trial.
Defendants' motion for a more definite statement will also be denied. The paragraphs under attack, 11 and 12, are sufficiently clear and detailed to permit defendants to file a responsive pleading and, therefore, satisfy the requirement of Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If there is any deficiency in the information therein contained, resort may be had to discovery procedures to aid in the preparation of the answer. Bell v. Novick Transfer Company, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 279, 280 (D.C.D.Md.1955); 2 Moore's Federal Practice P12:18.
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