the Court before entering a plea of guilty.
9. Each defendant was adequately represented by counsel when the guilty pleas were entered.
10. The pleas of guilty of the five defendants were not based on any statements, written or oral, given by them while under allegedly illegal detention, nor on any evidence allegedly illegally seized, nor were the pleas induced by any promise or threat by federal or state law enforcement officers, the United States Attorney, the Court, or any officers of the Court, but were voluntarily entered after consultation with counsel and with full knowledge of their rights under the law because they were, in truth, guilty of the crimes charged.
The sentence subsequently entered by the Court, after evaluation and study, was imposed by written order in accordance with the provisions of law. No need existed on the part of the Court to have said defendants appear before the Court prior to the reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(b), of said sentences as originally imposed. United States v. De Blasis, 177 F.Supp. 484 (D.Md.1959). The legislative history of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208 indicates that Congress did not intend that a prisoner would have to be returned from prison to be present in the courtroom when his original sentence was affirmed or reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(b):
'After receiving from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons a summary of this study, the court in fixing the final penalty may affirm the original sentence or impose a modified sentence under any applicable provision of law. The prisoner would not have to be present in the court when this final action on his sentence is taken. Inasmuch as the original sentence of the court represents the maximum authorized by statute, any later modification by the court would constitute a reduction in sentence. There is ample precedent for this provision. The last line of 43, Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C., ch. 237) reads: 'The defendant's presence is not required at a reduction of sentence under rule 35.' H.R.Rep.No. 1946, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1958).'
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Sentence was imposed consistent with provisions of existing law.
2. Jurisdiction existed in the Court to impose sentence.
3. Sentence was not imposed in excess of the maximum authorized by law.
4. Each sentence is not otherwise subject to collateral attack.
5. Each defendant had the aid of legal counsel.
6. No promises, threats or intimidations were imposed on any of the defendants prior to the entry of pleas of guilty.
7. The allegations in each of defendant's motions that he entered his plea of guilty as a result of threats or promises made by law enforcement officers, the United States Attorney or the Court is not established by credible testimony.
8. The pleas of guilty were voluntarily and knowingly entered, and were free from coercion or promises of any kind.
9. The statements of defendants which allegedly resulted from unlawful detentions and from the evidence allegedly illegally sized do not invalidate the sentences imposed upon their voluntary pleas of guilty made after consultation with competent counsel and with full knowledge of their Constitutional rights.
10. There was no denial of any Constitutional rights of any of the defendants nor of any rights given under the laws of the United States to any of the defendants, nor are the sentences otherwise subject to collateral attack.
11. No basis exists to grant the motion to vacate sentences as to any of said defendants.
AND NOW, THIS 14th day of November, 1962, the Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the Set Aside the Sentences Imposed on Ronald Matthew Mego, James Barton Jackson, Carl William Thomas, Joseph Louis Rozanc, and Michael DeBlassio, Jr., on the 11th day of August, 1961, in which each of the defendants was committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for a period of fifteen years, and in which it was provided that each defendant shall become eligible for parole upon serving a term of three years is, in each instance, refused.
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