The Supreme Court has said:
'* * * To be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301 (of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185) must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.' United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 583, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960).
The case of United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., supra, involved a situation where a union was attempting to enforce an agreement to arbitrate and, of course, the case was decided before the arbitrator had made a decision. The principles stated therein, however, were applied immediately to a case where an arbitrator had rendered a decision and the union was attempting to enforce it, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). The present case involves a situation where no one is attempting to enforce an arbitrator's award but where a union is attempting to upset an award by an arbitrator. However, there is no reason why the principles enunciated in the two Steelworkers cases as to the strength of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement and an arbitrator's award resulting therefrom should not be applied to the present case.
Both sides in the present case agreed in the collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate grievances such as the one which has caused the dispute in the present case and they gave the arbitrator power to make the award which he made. All plaintiff's contentions must be denied because taking them separately or as a whole this court would exceed its power as it is limited by the Supreme Court decisions if it should attempt to reverse the award of the arbitrator.
Comment on two of plaintiff's contentions is in order.
As to the contention concerning Freedman's refusal to stand cross-examination, the effect of that refusal, and the conclusion to be drawn therefrom, it is obvious from Freedman's testimony that he did refuse to answer questions about the source of the memoranda on cross-examination.
The arbitrator's conclusions from Freedman's refusal to stand cross-examination on this vital question were entirely justified.
As to the contention that the arbitrator ignored the 14-day notice required for a 'just cause' discharge, the arbitrator mitigated the punishment (on defendant's concession that a finding of 'flagrant misconduct' was not necessary to sustain the discharge) by allowing Freedman severance pay of $ 2,000 and salary of $ 400 for the 14-day period and thus awarded him everything to which he was entitled after a 'just cause' discharge.
There is no unresolved issue of fact. Summary judgment will be entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.