of defendant employer's failure to make payments to union health insurance, retirement, and severance pay founds.
The only problem before the court is whether the arbitrator's award should be enforced. There is ample authority upholding the power of a United States District Court to enforce the award of an arbitrator in a dispute over the alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement: Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. Rosinsky, D.C., 134 F.Supp. 607, aff'd 229 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1956); A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959); Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1959).
The employer's contention that the arbitrator exceeded his authority is without merit. It was the arbitrator's problem to interpret the agreement and determine whether or not the employer's opening and operation of the North Carolina plant amounted to a breach of the agreement. The arbitrator found that this did amount to a breach, and in doing so he acted well within the authority conferred upon him by the agreement's arbitration provisions.
The collective bargaining agreement requires the employer to pay to the union certain percentages of the gross payroll for a health insurance fund, a retirement fund, and a severance pay fund. The union wishes to examine the employer's books to see whether the employer owes money under these provisions. The arbitrator directed that the union be permitted to examine the books for this purpose and this award will be enforced. Whether or not the employer must make payments on account of the non-union employees at the North Carolina plant was not discussed by the arbitrator or argued before me. Consequently, I am not here deciding anything beyond the enforcement of the arbitrator's award granting an examination of the books. Specifically I am not deciding whether or not the employer is obliged under the agreement to make any payments, and I am not deciding whether or not defendant must discontinue the operation of the North Carolina plant.
The letter dated March 30, 1960, gave permission to the employer to open the North Carolina plant on condition (1) that the Philadelphia plant be operated on a full time work basis, (2) that the employees of the North Carolina plant join, and that the North Carolina plant operate under a collective agreement with, the Grifton local union of the International Ladies Garment Workers, and (3) that the employer use his best efforts and good faith in helping the I.L.G.W.U. to organize the shop in North Carolina.
The first condition was met completely and presents no real problem. The second and third conditions, however, present more of a problem. The arbitrator decided that, because the second and third conditions were not met, permission had not been granted and that, therefore, defendant violated its collective agreement by opening a plant in North Carolina. Defendant contends that this conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law because (it contends) the conditions were illegal in that the efforts by the local union and the employer to persuade the North Carolina employees to join the Grifton local union might have violated the North Carolina 'right to work' law, Sec. 2, c. 328, N.C.Session Laws, 1947, and might have constituted an unfair practice under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
This contention must be rejected. The fact that plaintiff or defendant individually or jointly might have violated the North Carolina act or the N.L.R.A. or both in attempts to carry out the conditions of the agreement does not without more make the conditions illegal. There is no showing that either the union or the employer used any illegal methods in attempts to carry out the conditions. The arbitrator was correct in deciding that the conditions were not met, and that, therefore, no permission had been granted to open the defendant's new plant in North Carolina.
Plaintiff may submit an order for summary judgment in its favor and giving plaintiff permission to examine defendant's books as sought in the present action.