Appeal, No. 3, Oct. T., 1962, from order of Court of Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill County, May T., 1960, No. 31 Misc., in the matter of revocation of restaurant liquor license issued to Lakewood Company. Order reversed.
Robert H. Jordan, Special Assistant Attorney General, with him George G. Lindsay and Horace A. Segelbaum, Assistant Attorneys General, and David Stahl, Attorney General, for Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, appellant.
Fred C. Pace, with him Thomas B. Noonan, and Noonan & Pace, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.
[ 198 Pa. Super. Page 170]
The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board issued a citation to Lakewood Company to show cause why its restaurant liquor license should not be revoked for certain violations. After hearing, the board suspended appellee's license for a period of thirty days. An appeal was taken to the Court of Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill County which reversed the order of the board. This appeal followed.
The board based its suspension on the following findings: "1. The licensee, by its servants, agents or employees made a charge for admittance to a portion of the licensed premises, on July 11, 25; August 15 and 22, 1959.
"2. The licensed establishment has an inside passage or communication to or with a public place of amusement."
The reasoning of the court below in reversing the board was stated by it as follows: "Year after year the conditions of the premises have been the same. In all these years there is nothing in the record to show that the appellant was ever requested to make any changes
[ 198 Pa. Super. Page 171]
in the premises. It would therefore seem that it was proper for the appellant to assume that it was complying with the regulations of the Board .... The record further shows that immediately after the appellant received the citation on November, 1959, that the changes were promptly made .... If there was violation, the Board acquiesced in it."
The court below made no finding as to whether or not a violation had occurred. It based its conclusion on the irrelevancy of such a violation because the "Board acquiesced in it." A violation is to be determined by the Liquor Code; it is not dependent upon the action or inaction of the board in enforcing the law. The fact that the construction of the appellee's premises constituted a ...