work is such a function of management; and that the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement does not contemplate the arbitration of such broad, general questions. Furthermore, there is nothing specifically stated in the collective bargaining agreement as to the Employer's right to subcontract work; therefore, it can be argued that the present dispute does not concern the interpretation of that agreement.
Although we might have found the Employer's position meritorious at one time in the past, it is now clearly the law that any subject matter which is not specifically excluded from the grievance-arbitration procedure in a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike clause and a broad arbitration clause, is included in the grievance-arbitration procedure.
In the case of United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960), the Supreme Court of the United States said:
'In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.' At pp. 584, 585, 80 S. Ct. at p. 1354.
In that case, the collective bargaining agreement contained a clause reserving to management all functions normally associated with management; there was no specific provision in the agreement with regard to the company's right to subcontract work; and the union's grievance was stated as follows:
"We are hereby protesting the Company's actions, of arbitrarily and unreasonably contracting out work to other concerns, that could and previously has been performed by Company employees.
"This practice becomes unreasonable, unjust and discriminatory in lieu (sic) of the fact that at present there are a number of employees that have been laid off * * *.
"Confronted with these facts we charge that the Company is in violation of the contract * * *." pp. 575, 576, 80 S. Ct. at p. 1349.
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and the Court of Appeals, both of which had held that the Employer did not have to arbitrate the broad question of subcontracting work.
In light of these cases, we are compelled to grant the Union's motion for judgment on the pleadings and order the Employer to proceed to arbitration. We can see no distinction between the case at bar and the Warrior and Gulf case, discussed above.
And now, to wit, this 18th day of May, 1962, It Is Hereby Ordered that the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The defendant's motion for summary judgment in its favor is denied. The defendant is ordered to proceed to arbitration as prayed for in the complaint.