did not preclude him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record showing that claimant was qualified for any specific employment, and that such a finding was essential to support the Council's decision. Interpreting the relevant section of the Act, the Court said at page 932 of 176 F.Supp.:
'The word 'any' must be read in the light of what is reasonably possible, not what is conceivable. The statute must be given a reasonable interpretation. It is a remedial statute and must be construed liberally. It was not the intention of Congress to impose a test so severe as that required by the Secretary as to exact as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a claim the elimination of every possibility of gainful employment.'
A similar approach was taken in Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2nd Cir. 1960), where, as in Klimaszewski, and the instant case, the issue involved was the ability of a claimant to engage in substantial gainful activity. The Court, at page 921, stated that two questions had to be resolved to determine that issue:
'* * * what can applicant do, and what employment opportunities are there for a man who can do only what applicant can do? Mere theoretical ability to engage in substantial gainful activity is not enough if no reasonable opportunity for this is available * * *.'
The record before the Court in Kerner was found to be deficient because there was no evaluation of claimant's ability to perform certain acts, such as standing, lifting, walking, etc. Claimant's employment picture was equally as obscure.
'Here is a man, admittedly able to do only light work, and this at a location reachable without undue exertion, and presenting a prospective employer with the unattractive combination of age, heart disease, diabetes and acute worry about himself. No one of these factors might be fatal to employment -- indeed, the constellation of them may not be -- but the Secretary had nothing save speculation to warrant a finding that an applicant thus handicapped could in fact obtain substantial gainful employment.'
The Court there noted that it should not be difficult for the Secretary to provide evidence as to what claimant could do and what he could not do and as to the employment opportunities available to him. Such evidence was viewed by the Court as a prerequisite to the determination of the issue before it. Several Circuits have accepted the Kerner rationale. Ferran v. Flemming, 293 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1961); Hall v. Flemming, 289 F.2d 290, 291 (6th Cir. 1961).
Because of the above noted deficiencies of the record before us on these material points, we will remand the record to the Secretary, pursuant to the provisions of 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 405(g), for additional evidence and findings and it is so ordered.