Appeal, No. 33, Feb. T., 1962, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, Oct. T., 1958, No. 30, in case of Roy Cole v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company. Decree reversed.
Leigh B. Maxwell, for appellant.
James P. Harris, Jr., for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ. (woodside, J., absent).
[ 197 Pa. Super. Page 649]
OPINION BY MONTGOMERY, J.
In this case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Board found upon sufficient and competent evidence (inter alia) that, "... in August, 1955 the claimant was employed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company as a line worker. During said period the area in which the claimant worked was flooded by a flash flood and the claimant's duties required him to work in said area, trouble-shooting and repairing damage to Company facilities caused by the flood.
[ 197 Pa. Super. Page 650]
"... the defendant company arranged for the notified their employees to get their first para-typhoid vaccine shot at the Lakeville Club, at Wilsonville, on August 23, 1955 and their second and third shots on August 31, 1955 and September 7, 1955, at their Pennsylvania Power & Light Company office in Honesdale.
"... claimant received said para-typhoid shots in his left arm on the above mentioned dates. On September 7, 1955 following the third shot, the claimant's left arm hurt and gave him trouble. ... as a result of the injection on September 7, 1955 the claimant suffered radiculoneuritis, occurring as a result of the typhoid vaccine toxin attacking the peripheral nerve of the left arm and traveling over said nerve to attack the spine."
The issue presented to us is whether the above recited set of circumstances constitutes an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Although the Referee found that it did, the Board concluded that it did not, and disallowed compensation. The lower court affirmed and this appeal followed.
In its appeal to the Board from the decision of the Referee, appellee contended that this was neither an injury nor an accident as contemplated by the Act, and further, was not an occurrence within the scope of claimant's employment. The decision of the Board was not based on the last contention but only on the first two, viz., that this did not constitute an accidental in, jury as intended by the Act.
Section 301(c), art. III of the Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, as amended (77 P.S. 411), defines the terms "injury" and "personal injury" to mean only violence to the physical structure of the body, and ...