Appeal, No. 33, Jan. T., 1962, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Sept. T., 1959, No. 16, in case of Township of Salisbury v. Sun Oil Company, James O. Reinhard and Kathryn Reinhard. Appeal dismissed.
Paul A. McGinley, for appellants.
James G. Kellar, with him Joseph and Kellar, for appellee.
Before Bell, C.j., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen and O'brien, JJ.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE EAGEN
In 1958, appellee, the Township of Salisbury (Township) established a zoning commission (Commission) to prepare a comprehensive zoning plan for the districting of the Township. A "City planner" was employed, and in 1959 he submitted to the Commission initial drafts of a proposed zoning map and ordinance.
In conjunction with the proposed zoning plan, in 1959, the Township enacted an interim temporary ordinance (effective, as amended, until January 31, 1960), that made it a summary offense, punishable by fine, to erect any type of structure or building other than a single family detached dwelling house within the Township without first securing a permit from the township board of commissioners (Commissioners). The appellants, Sun Oil Company and James and Kathryn Reinhard, submitted an application for a building permit to the Commissioners to permit construction of a gasoline service station upon property owned by the individual defendants. After a meeting, at which appellants presented their reasons for granting their application and neighboring property owners opposed the grant, the Commissioners denied the application since the subject property was zoned "R-1 Residence" in the proposed ordinance. (The property is so classified in the final zoning ordinance passed in January, 1960.)
Instead of appealing the Commissioners' refusal of their application to the court of common pleas, appellants ignored the decision of the Commissioners and commenced with the work for which the permit had been denied. The Township filed a bill in equity seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain the appellants from continuing construction of the gasoline station. The injunction was granted, and following a hearing on exceptions, the court entered a final decree making the injunction permanent. Appellants here appeal the entry of this decree.
Appellants contend that the ordinance, requiring the permit was a "stopgap" or interim ordinance, passed as a temporary expedient until the regular zoning ordinance was enacted, and, hence, was invalid under Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949). Since, however, the so-called "stopgap" ordinance is no longer in effect, having expired January 31,
, we need not address ourselves to the argument; the central issue raised thereby being moot. Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal. See Brecht v. Board of Public Education, 330 Pa. 331, 199 Atl. 152 ...