counsel of choice at the time of his conviction in 1951, was appointed to represent him at the hearing on the rule.
An examination of the pertinent records and transcripts
show conclusively that petitioner is not entitled to relief for any reason set forth in his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment. It would be completely superfluous to order a hearing to take testimony in order to find as a fact that which the record already clearly and convincingly discloses. Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797, 799 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Dorsch, 156 F.Supp. 61, 63 (W.D.Pa.1957).
Petitioner contends the sentence was illegal because at the time he was arraigned he was not represented by counsel. However, the records show that DiPippa was arraigned on April 16, 1951; that he was represented by his chosen counsel, A. Arthur Boscia, Esq., that his counsel was present and that petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty. (Copy of Transcript of April 16, 1951, marked Exhibit C.) The Indictment at No. 13296, which was found, bears DiPippa's signature to this plea of Not Guilty, under date of April 16, 1951.
Subsequently, when called for trial on May 16, 1951, in the presence of his counsel, DiPippa changed his plea to Guilty. (See Transcript of May 16, 1951, filed February 14, 1962). The Indictment at No. 13296 bears his signature to his plea of Guilty under date of May 16, 1951. The trial proceeded against some of his co-defendants and they were found guilty by a jury. See: United States v. Marpes, 198 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1952).
Petitioner also contends that his sentence was illegal because the court failed to ask him if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed. The transcript of the sentencing proceeding shows that the petitioner was given every opportunity to speak, and did so at length. (Transcript of July 2, 1951, at pp. 17-19.)
An appropriate order will be entered denying the petition.