Wohl Option Agreement and the Contract for Disposition were executed. Consequently, the land formerly designated under the Plan for use as a street will now be put to commercial use, i.e., occupied by a portion of the proposed hotel without the prior independent analysis required by the Amendment. They argue that the Amendment was enacted for their benefit, and therefore they are entitled to have the erection of a hotel on Parcel 'B' enjoined. We are constrained to disagree.
The land area which was formerly the southern portion of Chatham Street is minimal, and the Authority, with the approval of Council (section I of the Plan, p. 22), had the power and duty to conform the streets, especially portions of intersecting streets, to meet the requirements of the various commercial redevelopment projects as they arose and were accepted. Section J of the Plan specifically authorized modifications and both modifications were approved by the HHFA. The proposed construction of a hotel on Parcel 'B' as amended is the exercise of a contractual right possessed by the Authority for the benefit of the City of Pittsburgh pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan and the Loan and Grant Contract of 1955, which designated that Parcel exclusively for commercial uses including a hotel.
We hold that the 1959 Amendment is not applicable to the 1955 Redevelopment Plan, as modified, to the Loan and Grant Contract, as amended, or to the Disposition Contract between the Authority and the Golden Triangle Motor Hotel, Inc., and, thus, plaintiffs have not stated a claim on which equitable relief can be granted.
We agree with plaintiffs' counsel that Congress has the power to regulate federally-financed redevelopment projects and to require independent analysis of the need for transient housing prior to new construction, but our examination of the pertinent legislation prior to the 1959 Amendment has convinced us that Congress did not exercise that power. A Congressional policy precluding the use for transient purposes of housing built with the aid of mortgages insured under the National Housing Act of 1934 (12 U.S.C.A. § 1701) was made crystal clear in 1954 by an addition to that Act (12 U.S.C.A. § 1731b(i)) authorizing hotel owners to seek injunctions against violations. Thus it appears that Congress was very much aware of that policy, especially in 1954 when it enacted the Housing Act of that year; but, notwithstanding, as revealed by an examination of that Act and the several Housing Acts which followed, it was not until 1959 that Congress actually applied that policy to urban renewal plans and prohibited provisions permitting new construction of hotels and transient housing from being incorporated into such plans thereafter.
With respect to construction of transient housing in redevelopment and renewal areas, it seems that during the period from 1949 to 1959, Congress was content to rely upon the judgment of the Administrator, or his delegates, and the good faith and economic acumen of the public-spirited citizens comprising the public authorities, planning commissions, and the city councils involved. The legislative history, we think, clearly negatives any intent on the part of Congress to make the 1959 Amendment applicable to pre-1959 provisions permitting new construction of hotels and transient housing.
Moreover, the Housing Acts were not passed for the benefit of hotels,
and if the 1959 Amendment is correctly construed to be prospective, plaintiffs have no standing to maintain this legal attack upon the 1955 Plan and its provision permitting the construction of a hotel. If plaintiffs and their employees will be financially injured, as they allege, by the prospective lawful competition, such injuries are damnum absque injuria. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 58 S. Ct. 300, 82 L. Ed. 374 (1938); Taft Hotel Corporation v. Housing & Home Finance, 162 F.Supp. 538, 539-540 (D.Conn.1958), aff'd 262 F.2d 307, 308 (2d Cir. 1958); Gart v. Cole, 166 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.1958), aff'd 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
Plaintiffs are not parties to any of the contracts involved. The HHFA which is a party to the Loan and Grant Contract is not a party to this suit. Conceding that plaintiffs could establish all the facts alleged in their complaint at a trial, including the averment that the height restriction contained in the Plan will be violated, and, in addition, (1) that other irregularities and ultra vires acts exist in the manner in which the Governmental agencies propose to dispose of Parcel 'B' pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan of 1955; (2) that public hearings required by law were not held; (3) that communications between the Authority and the HHFA Agency should be interpreted as plaintiffs contend; and (4) that irregularities exist in the manner of execution and implementation of the loans authorized by the Loan and Grant Contract; we think that they would not be entitled to relief. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, supra, 302 U.S. at pp. 478-483, 58 S. Ct. 300; Gart v. Cole, supra, 263 F.2d at p. 250, Gart v. Cole, supra, 166 F.Supp. at pp. 134-136; Taft Hotel Corporation v. Housing & Home Finance, supra, 262 F.2d at p. 308. In short, we hold that competitors such as the plaintiff-hotels have no standing to complain of irregularities in the manner of execution of the Redevelopment Plan and the Loan and Grant Contract of 1955, their Amendments and Modifications.
An appropriate order granting the motion for summary judgment will be entered.