as they affect labor-management relations.' 29 U.S.C.A. § 401(a).
After a careful examination of the statute upon which plaintiff premises his prayer for relief, I am impelled to dismiss the complaint as it relates to his employer for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. To so liberally construe the statute, without a clear and manifest intention on the part of Congress, would preempt Congressional intention and create an unintended avalanche of suits between employee and employer in the Federal Courts.
There is nothing in the act to indicate jurisdiction in this Court for an action by an employee against an employer to review a justification or non-jurisdiction for a discharge.
In short, this statute deals with the union-member relationship and in no way supports jurisdiction of a suit involving the employer-employee relationship, Gross v. Kennedy, D.C., 183 F.Supp. 750; Strauss v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, D.C., 179 F.Supp. 297; Bennett v. Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local No. 701, 39 Labor Cases No. 66183.
A review of the legislative history of the act militates against any conclusion that Congress intended the Act to have application to employers. Judge Austin Staley of this Circuit has most thoroughly reviewed the legislative history of enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act, and the remarks of the framers of this legislation evince throughout an intention to confine the enactment to inner union rights, Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625, 3rd Cir.
Since no other basis exists upon which to rest federal jurisdiction, I have no alternative but to dismiss the complaint as it relates to the defendant, William G. Johnston Company.
MOTION OF LOCAL UNION NO. 24
The legal proposition posed by the union's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count Two of plaintiff's complaint is as follows:
Does jurisdiction rest with the United States District Court in a suit brought by an individual to recover damages against a union for allegedly conspiring with his employer to dismiss him from his employment?
It appears abundantly clear that the act complained of is an unfair labor practice within the purview of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 which the courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C.A. 158; San Diego Bldg. Trades, Council, Millmen's Union, etc., 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775; United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-583. 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409. See Beanchamps v. Weeks, 43 CCH Labor Cases, Para. 17,196.
The Landrum-Griffin Act does not supplant remedies available under the law. Where a remedy does exist through other Congressional legislation specially geared for such purpose, and no indication is evident in the Act pursued which provides the remedy sought, nor any expressed or manifest intent on the part of the framers of said Act evident in any of their pronouncements, I have no basis to read into the Act this jurisdiction. This view is buttressed by Section 103 of the Act which provides, inter alia, as follows:
'Nothing contained in this subchapter (Title I of the Act) shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and by-laws of any labor organization.' (29 U.S.C.A. § 413)
Since the element of damages stems basically from the allegation of the alleged conspiracy to dismiss plaintiff from his employment, I am constrained to conclude that any claim for damages either under Count One or Count Two of the complaint is not within the Court's jurisdiction.
An appropriate order is entered.
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