antitrust laws of the United States * * *' (Preamble, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1225). As in other antitrust legislation, the Congress considered private antitrust suits as a definite part of the broad enforcement policy. Such suits aim to enlist the business public as allies of the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court stated:
'* * * It is clear that Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement * * * when it gave to any injured party a private cause of action * * *' Bruce's Juices Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, at 751, 67 S. Ct. 1015, at 1019, 91 L. Ed. 1219 (1947).
While it is clear that Congress intended the public to be an ally, the alliance in many cases was circumscribed by specific provisions of the various Acts. The venerable Sherman Anti-Trust Act, prior to the enactment of § 16 of the Clayton Act in 1914, gave no right to a private party to seek injunctive relief. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 37 S. Ct. 718, 61 L. Ed. 1256 (1916). Thus, the Supreme Court would not allow judicial legislation to provide a power to grant injunctive relief where only the right of treble damages existed by Congressional expression. In the instant case, the Act specifies a suit for damages for any act of bad faith' * * * in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with said dealer * * *' (15 U.S.C.A. § 1222).
Where Congress has provided a remedy in a statute which by its terms creates a cause of action where none previously existed, the statutory remedy is exclusive and no other relief is available. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 28 S. Ct. 726, 52 L. Ed. 1096 (1908); Hassel v. United States, 34 F.2d 34 (3rd Cir. 1929).
In the Hassel case the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Aptly stated the rule of law.
'* * * where a statute defines a proceeding and prescribes a remedy, the statutory remedy is exclusive seems to be sustained by an unvarying line of judicial decisions beginning with the Supreme Court and running through both state and federal jurisdictions. * * *' (at p. 36).
That the Act before this court creates a new cause of action by the franchised dealer against the manufacturer seems clear. The overwhelming bargaining power of the manufacturer made the franchise agreement subject to the whim and caprice of the manufacturer. Thus, Congress, in an attempt to put the parties on an equal footing, passed this Act providing a remedy of damages where bad faith was exhibited by the manufacturer to the dealer. But Congress neglected to provide for any additional remedy while the damage suit was pending. Either Congress had not recalled the Supreme Court's treatment of the injunction-deficient Sherman Act; or, the legislators did not wish to provide the powerful remedy of injunction in this cause of action. Whatever be the case, this court is of the opinion that it should not read into the Act a right to injunction for the plaintiff.
This court realizes that the franchise is a valuable property right, but it seems that the Act construed here does not provide the clarity necessary for this court to determine that the plaintiff has a right for injunctive relief.
This court cannot agree with plaintiff that this question is to be answered by recourse to the general equity powers inherent in the district court as restated by Judge Maris in Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine Corporation, 122 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir. 1941). It is true that the Judiciary Act, §§ 11, as continued in the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41, does prescribe equity powers for the courts of the United States as it existed in England 'at the time our government was established.' However, we consider recourse to such powers unjustified in the instant case.
Congress in enacting the statute here in question, has stated in specific terms therein the relief to be granted. Thus this court feels itself foreclosed from granting an injunction -- a remedy not provided in the Act -- where Congress has created the innovation of a cause of action in a situation where none existed before. In such case, the remedy provided must be taken as exclusive.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby Granted and it is So Ordered.
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