The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORD, JR.
This action was brought to recover damages for minor plaintiff's injuries sustained on July 5, 1959, as a result of an accident while using a sliding board manufactured by third-party defendant and installed at defendant's swimming pool. The original suit was by plaintiffs against the owner of the swimming pool. The defendant owner then joined the third-party defendant on the theory that there was a defect in the manufacture, i.e. a V-shaped groove, amounting to a fault in the sliding board design, in which groove the minor plaintiff's finger was caught.
The Marshal's return shows service of Third-Party Summons and Complaint, Notice, Motion, Order, Third-Party Complaint and Complaint on the American Playground Device Co. by handing to and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with Sidney Lichtenstein, Manufacturer's Representative, American Playground Device Co., personally at 223 South 10th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on August 8, 1960.
The defendant owner and operator of the swimming pool, in his capacity as third-party plaintiff, points out that Mr. Lichtenstein was the person in charge of the premises at 223 South Tenth Street, Philadelphia, which premises are listed in the Philadelphia telephone directory as the office of American Playground Device Co., telephone number MArket 7-5089. This address was listed in the 1959 telephone books, was repeated in the 1960 book, and is presently in the 1961 directory. He also says -- and it has not been denied -- that the American Playground Device Co. name is painted on the premises at 223 South Tenth Street, that its advertising displays and circulars appear in the windows, and its products are for sale at that store address.
Third-party defendant, by its counsel, made a general appearance and filed an answer on August 24, 1960. In that answer it admitted diversity of citizenship and jurisdiction, and denied or disclaimed knowledge as to the other matters alleged, and thus placed the case at issue.
To this supplemental complaint filed by the plaintiffs, no answer has yet been filed. On October 27, 1961, however, the third-party defendant (hereafter to be called American) filed a motion to set aside the original service in the third-party action and vacate its appearance. In that motion, American assigns a list of numbered reasons for the granting of the motion, which reasons may be summarized as follows:
American concedes that it was served with summons and complaint on August 5, 1960, but points out and argues that American is an Indiana corporation, with manufacturing plant and principal place of business in Anderson, Indiana. It is not registered as a foreign corporation in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and had not been so registered at the times involved herein. The sliding board, it goes on to say, was designed and manufactured at Anderson, Indiana, and not in Pennsylvania.
American's main point is its assertion that it entered its general appearance under the authority of Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1957). Under the rule of that case, it says, the service of process upon it would have been effective.
Thereafter, American says, and after the filing of its general appearance, the law as stated in the Florio case, and upon which it had relied, was upset by a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down July 17, 1961: Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961). Under that decision, American says, the service of process would not have been good.
American further says that the effect of the Rufo decision was retroactive, just as though the law had never been otherwise, quoting:
'* * * In general, the construction placed upon a statute by the courts becomes a part of the act, from the very beginning. And when former decisions are overruled, the reconsidered pronouncement becomes the law of the statute from the date of its enactment.' Buradus v. General Cement Products Co., 159 Pa.Super. 501, 504, 48 A.2d 883, 885 (1946).
It will be seen that American is asking most extraordinary relief. In the first place, it has cited no authority to the effect that reliance upon a rule of law which is overruled by an intervening decision is justification for the withdrawal of a general appearance.
In the second place, American has placed nothing on the record to demonstrate its reliance on the rule of the Florio case. As the record stands, there is nothing to show American's reliance on the Florio case beyond the mere assertion of the pleader.
Since the next point is in any event fatal to the position of American, no further discussion will be devoted here to the last mentioned difficulties. That point is that the change of law described by this third-party defendant has no bearing on its own situation. Florio and Rufo were concerned solely with substituted service, that is, ...