Defendant contends that this Rule was adopted for a specific purpose alien to the matter here in issue. If that is so, it has not been so construed by the courts.
In Kerna et al. v. Trucking, Inc., D.C.W.D.Pa., 1944, 3 F.R.D. 365, 368, the Court said:
'The Pennsylvania courts held, even before the amendment of Rule 2002 by adding the proviso in subsection (d), that an insurance company which insured an automobile owner and took a loan receipt similar in form to the ones under consideration in the instant case, was not the 'real party in interest' who must be joined as a party-plaintiff. * * *
'If we were to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, to this case, we would arrive at the same result. Rule 17(a) provides: 'Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest;' but the Circuit Court of Appeals of this Circuit held in Re The Plow City, 122 F.2d 816, 818, that an insurance company which loaned the assured the amount of his loss to be repaid out of any recoveries by the assured from the party responsible for the loss, was not a 'real party in interest' who must bring suit. * * *'
In Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Springfield Dyeing Co., Inc., 1940, 3 Cir., 109 F.2d 533, 537, the Court following Luckenbach said:
'* * * The loan receipt, which is in evidence, makes plain its purpose and effect. The transaction was precisely what, under the circumstances, it purported to be, a loan made in a manner which is both legally valid and effective for the purpose. * * *'
As indicated above, the Court of Appeals of this Circuit in The Plow City followed Luckenbach and the Pennsylvania Rule without noting a single exception.
It seems to me that the rationale of this whole problem is well set forth in the comment on 'loan receipts' in 157 A.L.R. 1268 as follows:
'Insurers, being reluctant to appear in lawsuits as formal parties because juries are supposed to be prejudiced against insurers, and bearing in mind the fact that if they can prevent subrogation they can avoid appearing in an action, have quite generally adopted the policy of settling policy claims by making a loan. In fact this seems to be the primary motive for making such a settlement in the vast majority of the cases. This motive was discussed in Merrimack Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Trucking Corp. (1944) (182 Misc. 947), 46 NYS (2d) 736, wherein the court said: 'The 'Loan Receipt' is a device by the use of which insurance may be paid to avoid some of the consequences of subrogation. Whatever reasons there may be of a business character for the insurance company shying away from subrogation, there is one of great significance which manifests itself when the contracting parties appear before a court and jury. Insurance companies by experience find that when their financial interest is discovered by a trial jury in a suit they fare not so well. In their reluctance to reveal their presence in litigation, insurance carriers do not stand alone. The courts have decided times without number that the unnecessary disclosure to the jury of the presence of a liability insurance company in a negligence trial warrants a mistrial . . .. Should the court, upon piercing the mantle of the 'Loan Receipt' and discerning its clear objective, enforce the letter of § 210, Civil Practice Act, and thus condemn the practice of using 'Loan Receipts?' . . . What is wrong with the 'Loan Receipt?' The objection raised to its use emanates from the alleged wrongdoer. He insists on being confronted in court by the person who, at the time the suit is started, he considers in fact possessed the claim against him. Section 210, Civil Practice Act, a sound preventative against paying claims twice, justifies defendant's attitude on this motion. His complaint would find immediate redress if there were fear that a second claim could be urged for the one wrong. The 'Loan Receipt' admits of no such injustice. The objection narrows merely to the name of the party in the suit. Defendant's attorney argues that his client should defend against an insurance company by name . . .. There being no danger of more than one recovery against the wrongdoer, the court is not justified in inquiring into the motives of the parties to the 'Loan Receipt."'
Defendant's motion to add necessary parties plaintiff will be denied.