He goes on to say:
'Applying the foregoing 'stringent standards' ( Ussi v. Folsom, supra) the Examiner finds that although the claimant has certain impairments, the record fails to establish that they were sufficiently severe, at any time prior to February 16, 1959, to satisfy the statutory standard, i.e., to prevent any and all forms of substantial gainful activity.' (Record p. 16.)
Whether the standards set forth are stringent we do not care to comment upon. The fact remains that from the standards set forth in this Circuit and from the standards set forth in the case referred to by the Examiner, in our opinion the record clearly shows beyond any question that the severe injuries which this woman has suffered, her physical impairment, her educational background, her employment record and all other facts which we think it necessary to take into consideration lead to only one conclusion -- that her physical condition is such that she cannot of perform any substantial gainful activity based on the record as disclosed in this case.
This case is on all fours with the recent decision rendered by our late colleague Judge Egan in Ferricks v. Flemming, 188 F.Supp. 656 (E.D.Pa.1960). As stated by Chief Judge Biggs of our United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Klimaszewski v. Flemming, 176 F.Supp. 927, 932 (E.D.Pa.1959):
'* * * The statute must be given a reasonable interpretation. It is a remedial statute and must be construed liberally. It was not the intention of Congress to impose a test so severe as that required by the Secretary and to exact as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a claim the elimination of every possibility of gainful employment.'
We think the language of the Court in Dunn v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. 44, 48 (D.C.Ark.1958), is particularly applicable here.
'* * * But the act is concerned not with a standard man of ordinary and customary abilities, but with the particular person who may claim its benefits and the effect of the impairment upon that person, with whatever abilities or inabilities he has. Thus plaintiff's impairments would not prevent him from teaching courses in law, but the provisions of the act would be utterly futile if 'any substantial gainful activity' means activity utterly beyond the capacity of the particular person involved. 'Any substantial gainful activity' is such activity for which the particular claimant is reasonably qualified by education, training, or skill.'
Furthermore, the language of Judge Egan in the Ferricks case, supra, seems to meet the situation as well as can be expressed by us.
'* * * this ignores the facts of life as they apply to a crippled woman with an 8th grade education, now 58 years old. The field in which she may seek employment of her present capabilities is so narrow as to be practically nonexistent.' (188 F.Supp. p. 659)
We find it unnecessary to refer to the many other cases referred to by plaintiff and the Government in the able briefs and argument submitted on both sides, since, as we have stated, we feel that the Ferricks case, supra, and the Klimaszewski case, supra, set forth the rule in this Circuit and that the facts on the record clearly warrant judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Both sides have moved for summary judgment and since the above constitutes our findings of fact and conclusions of law, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be denied. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
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