or otherwise specifically identify the furniture involved.
Under cross-examination, Sidell testified as follows:
'Q. You say you did buy furniture after you assumed stock ownership in the corporation; is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
'Q. Do you know how much? A. About $ 2500 once, about $ 1200 another time.
'Q. You have nothing to show that any furniture bought during your ownership in the stock was actually bought by you personally, do you? A. Well, the only records that show this is that the exact amount of money that may have been paid by Ivy Hall Apartments bank account was then charged immediately in that same monthly statement submitted to the F.H.A. as a credit on the payment of my outstanding balance.
'Q. You have nothing with you? A. You have all the papers.
'By the Court:
'Q. Do I understand that the furniture you say you bought was paid for by checks on the account of Ivy Hall Apartments, Inc.? A. Yes, sir.
'Q. Were any documents in the form of bills of sale, bailment leases, or conditional sales agreements issued by whomever furniture was purchased from? A. No, sir. These were bought on open account.'
This is the sum and substance of the testimony respecting Sidell's claim of ownership of the furniture. There were no bills of sale, receipts, or evidence of title of any kind. The monthly statements submitted to the F.H.A. that might have shed some light on the expenditures for furniture were not produced. The books of the corporation were not produced. No one even knew where they were. Sidell did not even produce an inventory of the furniture for which he seeks to be paid some $ 15,000, exclusive of his claim for rent. He made no effort to produce any records of or testimony by any furniture supplier to show sales or delivery of any furniture to him.
Sidell's meager evidence fails utterly to support his various claims, and they must be dismissed in their entirety.
Even if the evidence had been sufficient to sustain Sidell's claim of ownership, we would nevertheless feel constrained to dismiss his claim. The mortgage included in its terms, inter alia, not only the realty but also the furniture on the premises, and thereafter brought upon the premises. The pledge was good and enforceable between the mortgagor and mortgagee. Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 222, 95 A. 451. Sidell was the president and sole stockholder of the corporate mortgagor. He personally controlled and directed all its business and handled all its affairs. To all intents and purposes, he was the corporation. We think that, for present purposes, justice and public policy demand that the corporate fiction be disregarded and that Sidell and the corporation be considered as identical, in accordance with the familiar rule as expressed in Tucker v. Binenstock, 1933, 310 Pa. 254, 263, 165 A. 247, 250:
'The fiction of a corporation as an entity distinct from the aggregate of individuals comprising it was designed to serve convenience and justice. There is consequently an exception recognized wherever the rule is known, namely, that the fiction will be disregarded and the individuals and corporation considered as identical whenever justice or public policy demand it and when the rights of innocent parties are not prejudiced thereby nor the theory of corporate entity made useless.'
The claims of Sidell to ownership of the furniture, for the value thereof and the rental value thereof will be disallowed.
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