Appeal, No. 26, March T., 1961, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-58573, in re claim of Della M. Stover. Decision affirmed.
John H. Broujos, for appellant.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.
Before Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ. (rhodes, P.j., absent).
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 93]
Della M. Stover was last employed as a heel sorter by the Carlisle Shoe Company, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 94]
Her final day of work was February 12, 1960. Her application for benefits was disallowed by the Bureau of Employment Security, the Referee, and the Board of Review on the ground that she had voluntarily terminated her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, and that she was therefore disqualified under the provisions of Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Act of December 5, 1936, P.L. (1937) 2897, 43 P.S. 751 et seq. This appeal followed.
The Carlisle Shoe Company furnished each of its employes with a handbook containing the following statement of Company policy: "Employes will be separated as quit without notice who: 1. Fail to report an absence from work within three days without reasonable excuse; 2. Fail to notify the Company of their intention to return to work within three days after they receive notice from the Company". Mrs. Stover had admittedly received one of these handbooks, and was aware of the Company policy. The sole question on this appeal is whether she satisfactorily complied with the reporting requirements. The Board of Review found against her on this issue, taking the position that her conduct was tantamount to an abandonment of the employer-employe relationship, and constituted a voluntary leaving without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
The applicable legal principles are well settled. The burden of proof was upon the claimant: Davis Unemployment Compensation Case, 195 Pa. Superior Ct. 361, 171 A.2d 558. Since the decision of the Board was against the party having the burden of proof, the question before us is whether the Board's findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law and its order, and can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the competent evidence: Busfield Unemployment Compensation Case, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 43,
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 95155]
A.2d 436. We must view the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the Board has found, bearing in mind that the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it are for the Board: Rosell Unemployment Compensation Case, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 556, 135 A.2d 769. We are bound by the Board's findings of fact if they are supported by ...