that Broomall was negligent for the purpose of ruling on this Motion.
It is clear that whether such negligence consists of violation of a statute or not, a defendant is not liable unless this negligence is a proximate cause of the accident. See 286(d) of the Restatement of Torts;
DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry, etc., Co., 1955, 380 Pa. 484, 488-489, 112 A.2d 372, and cases there cited; Kite v. Jones, 1957, 389 Pa. 339, 344-347, 132 A. 683; Kaplan v. Kaplan, 1951, 404 Pa. 147, 149-151, 171 A.2d 166. In the DeLuca case, supra, it is pointed out, 380 Pa. at pages 491-492, 112 A.2d 372, that the trial judge or appellate court must direct a verdict for defendant where there is no evidence from which the fact finder could make a finding of proximate cause.
In this case, Pollon, travelling at 10 to 15 M.P.H., never saw the minor child at any time (N.T. 109), so that the fact that defendant obstructed his view of her path for three feet could not have been a proximate cause of the accident.
If Pollon had seen her three feet from his car, it is clear that the car could not have been stopped prior to the accident. See analysis of Chief Justice Stern at pages 490-491 of the DeLuca case, supra, 380 Pa., at pages 375-376 of 112 A.2d. There is no evidence that the view of the minor or her elder companions was obstructed by the Broomall station wagon (N.T. 123).
For this and other reasons, Marchl et al. v. Dowling & Co., 1944, 157 Pa.Super. 91, 41 A.2d 427, relied on by plaintiff, is based on a substantially different factual situation. It is also noted that in the Dowling case, supra, 157 Pa.Super. at pages 94-95, 41 A.2d 427, the principle relied on by Chief Justice Stern in the DeLuca case, supra, 380 Pa. at page 491, 112 A.2d 372, is recognized and stated.
The language, relied on by plaintiff at pages 2 and 3 of her rebuttal brief (Document No. 29), in Anderson v. Bushong Pontiac Co., 1961, 404 Pa. 382, 386, 389-390 & 391, 171 A.2d 771, is inapplicable to the factual situation now before the court.
The briefs of the parties have been placed in the Clerk's file as Documents Nos. 27 to 29, inclusive.
And now, August 30, 1961, it is ordered that the motion for new trial (Document No. 24) is denied.