The opinion of the court was delivered by: DUSEN
This cause came on to be heard upon the verified petition of Bernard Samoff, Acting Regional Director of the Fourth Region of the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the Board), for a temporary injunction pursuant to Section 10(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act), pending the final disposition of the matters involved herein pending before the Board, and upon the issuance of an order to show cause why injunctive relief should not be granted as prayed in said petition. Respondent filed an answer to said petition. A hearing on the issues raised by the petition and answer was duly held beginning on August 23, 1961. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence bearing on the issues, and to argue on the evidence and the law. The Court has fully considered the petition, answer, evidence, arguments, and briefs of counsel. Upon the entire record, the Court makes the following:
1. Petitioner is Acting Regional Director of the Fourth Region of the Board, an agency of the United States, and filed the petition herein for and on behalf of the Board.
2. On or about July 11, 1961, Marriott Motor Hotels, Inc. (herein called Marriott), pursuant to the provisions of the Act, filed a charge with the Board alleging that Hotel, Motel and Club Employees' Union, Local 568, AFL-CIO (herein called respondent), a labor organization, has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7), subparagraph (C), of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § (b)(7)(C).
3. The aforesaid charge was referred to petitioner as Acting Regional Director of the Fourth Region of the Board.
4. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable cause to believe that:
(a) Respondent, an unincorporated association, is an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(b) Respondent maintains its principal office at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and at all times material herein respondent has been engaged within this judicial district in transacting business and in promoting and protecting the interests of its employee members.
(c) Marriott owns and operates motels and restaurants in various locations in the United States, including a new motel and restaurant at City Line and Monument Avenue, Lower Merion Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, (herein called Philadelphia Motel), which has been open for business since on or about July 14, 1961. Marriott receives more than $ 500,000 gross revenues annually from the operation of its motels. A majority of the residents of the motels are transient and remain less than a month. Marriott, during the past year, has received goods and materials from outside the State of Pennsylvania valued at in excess of $ 50,000 to be used in the operation of the aforesaid Philadelphia Motel.
(d) Respondent is not currently certified as the collective bargaining representative of any of Marriott's employees at the said Philadelphia Motel.
(e) No charge has been filed with the Board under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act alleging that Marriott has unlawfully recognized or assisted any labor organization.
(f) Notwithstanding the aforesaid, respondent, since on or about July 10, 1961, has been in the process of organizing the employees of Marriott and has asked such employees to join its union (N.T. 11, 76 and P-2).
(g) In furtherance of the aforesaid attempt to have Marriott's employees join respondent and accept or select respondent as their collective bargaining representative, respondent, since on or about July 10, 1961, has picketed or caused Marriott to be picketed at the Philadelphia Motel (P-1). The pickets have stopped or delayed Marriott's employees in their attempt to get to work (N.T. 70-75, 94-95).
(h) The aforesaid picketing has been conducted for more than thirty (30) days without the filing of a petition under Section 9(c) ...