it nevertheless is worthy of being given some weight in determining the meaning of Section 607. Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 6 Cir., 1922, 281 F. 709. For these reasons this Court is of the opinion that § 607 of the Act gives the Secretary of Labor and, under § 601, officers designated by him, the power to delegate to the Department of Justice or other governmental agency the investigatory function.
Next, respondent argues that the 'Memorandum of Understanding' between the two departments in any event does not delegate the right to investigate matters relating to requirement of reporting under Title II of the Act but rather retained them in the Department of Labor.
This argument would be plausible but for the fact that, as was pointed out previously, the division of labor provided for was made subject to arrangements agreed upon on a case by case basis. Such an arrangement was provided for on June 1, 1961 (Exhibit 3 of Petitioner's Memorandum), when the Commissioner, Bureaus of Labor-Management Reports in a letter to the Department of Justice delegated to that department the authority 'to conduct an investigation into any violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 in connection with the investigation of the Teamsters League of Philadelphia and related matters.'
Respondent also raises the contention that, since he is not personally charged with any responsibility under the Act, he cannot be subjected to a subpoena. He reads § 601(a) as merely permitting the Secretary to question those people who he believes may have violated or are about to violate the Act. The Court cannot agree. Section 601(a) empowers the Secretary to question any person he may deem necessary to enable him to determine the facts relative to the violation. The language of the statute shows that Congress also intended to give the Secretary of Labor the authority to question persons other than those directly charged with duties and responsibilities under the Act. Because of the plain meaning of § 601, the cited cases of General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 6 Cir., 1942, 125 F.2d 596, 140 A.L.R. 783 and United States v. Minker, 1956, 350 U.S. 179, 76 S. Ct. 281, 100 L. Ed. 185 are not considered controlling. In the former case, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor was required by the Court to show that the company was engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce before he could conduct an investigation of the company. The Court so held because the Administrator was only given authority over 'any industry subject to this Act' by § 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Minker case is not considered as controlling because the decision there was limited to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The Supreme Court held that an immigration officer is not empowered to subpoena a naturalized citizen who is the subject of an investigation by the Service, where the purpose of the investigation is to determine if good cause exists for the institution of denaturalization proceedings.
Respondent further contends that his constitutional right could be impaired if he were to comply with the subpoena. It is argued that although § 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, incorporated by § 601(b) of the present Act, provides immunity from prosecution, forfeiture or penalty for witnesses in return for their compulsory testimony, if the subpoena should later be determined a nullity, then the witness is not entitled to immunity. The cases cited by respondent to support this proposition ( Sherwin v. United States, 1925, 268 U.S. 369, 45 S. Ct. 517, 69 L. Ed. 1001, and Goodman v. United States, 8 Cir., 1960, 273 F.2d 853), are not on point. No subpoena was ever issued in those cases.
Another contention is that respondent's constitutional rights will be impaired because he would be subject to state prosecution even though given immunity under the Act. Such an argument is without merit. United States v. Murdock, 1931, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210.
Finally, respondent asserts that it would be contrary to all principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence to allow the official charged with the enforcement of labor laws to delegate his investigatory function to the agency whose duty it is to prosecute any violation thereof. Research on the part of the Court has been unsuccessful in finding any authority for this statement. Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 1957, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1205, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, the only case cited by respondent to support this statement, is not on point. Involved in the Sweezy case was a joint resolution of the state legislature, adopted pursuant to a subversive activities statute it had recently enacted, appointing the State Attorney General a 'one-man legislative committee.' During his legislative investigation the Attorney General propounded certain questions to the petitioner which he refused to answer. Thereafter, he refused to answer the same questions propounded to him by the County Court and was adjudged in contempt. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the ruling of the lower court. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed holding that petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The Supreme Court reasoned that it could not be known whether the questions petitioner refused to answer fell into the category of matters upon which the legislature wanted to be informed. At page 254 of the opinion in 354 U.S., at page 1214 of 77 S. Ct. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated:
'The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the information the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the absence of authority.'
The question whether the Attorney General of the State of New Hampshire could both investigate and prosecute was not discussed in the Sweezy case.
In summary the Court finds that the Secretary of Labor is authorized by § 601 of the Act to delegate his investigatory and subpoena functions; that he in fact did so delegate them to the Commissioner; that § 607 of the Act, read in conjunction with § 601, authorized the Commissioner to delegate his functions to the Department of Justice; and, that the Commissioner did in fact authorize the Department of Justice to conduct this investigation.
Government counsel may submit an appropriate form of decree to enforce the subpoena.