by complaint, to the person in charge thereof.'
Service was not so made upon the Secretary of Labor and Industry, but was sent by certified mail. The plaintiffs urge that this is an error that can be corrected. As of this date, no correction has yet been made. Therefore, it would appear proper that since the Secretary of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not properly before this Court, his motion to dismiss for lack of service of process over him should be granted, and that would be the end of the case as to him.
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, however, did not raise the question of improper service of process. However, he raises the question of jurisdiction, and we must look to the plaintiffs' complaint to see if there is jurisdiction.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends. In paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs' complaint, their allegations of jurisdiction in the Court are as follows:
'The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania has jurisdiction in this declaratory judgment proceeding pursuant to paragraph 2201 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for the reason that a federal question is involved; the amount involved is in excess of $ 10,000.00, and the jurisdiction is further expressly conferred by Federal Statutes.'
We might point out that this allegation does not comply or meet the simple form set forth in Form 2(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 28 U.S.C. Certainly Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not a section of law that would confer any jurisdiction upon this Court. Section 2201 of Title 28 United States Code does not confer jurisdiction. The Declaratory Judgment Act has been construed as being merely a procedural statute, and it would apply only in cases in which the Court only has jurisdiction. The Act did not confer any jurisdiction independent of what was theretofore existing. It is a procedural act only. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194; Stafford v. Superior Court of California, 9 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 407, 409.
The plaintiffs make the blanket assertion that a federal question is involved, but they have not told this Court what is the federal question. Their reasoning that we have jurisdiction under Rule 57 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under Section 2201, Title 28 United States Code is not supportable in law. They assert that jurisdiction is expressly conferred by federal statute, but fail to tell this Court which federal statute specifically confers jurisdiction on the Court. We know of none, nor is it the Court's duty to search for such a statute.
The requirements for pleading jurisdiction are succinctly set forth in Volume 4, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure § 14.75 as follows:
'Under Rule 8(a)(1) the statement of grounds of jurisdiction must be short and plain. The statement must be positive, certain, and sufficiently particular.
'In the statement grounds of jurisdiction must distinctly appear, and jurisdictional facts cannot be inferred argumentatively from allegations. Particular averments must not contradict and destroy the general averments relative to jurisdiction. Ordinarily, a complaint should plead only ultimate facts on the question of jurisdiction.'
The plaintiffs here make general averments, and their particular averments clearly show that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to determine this alleged controversy. Since we have no jurisdiction, we deem it inappropriate to pass or render any opinion on the other questions raised by parties here, especially whether or not the plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies available to them; whether or not they have the remedy in the state court against the state officials; and whether under such circumstances a district court should exercise its discretion to hear this case involving what is really an economic dispute between school districts and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
And now, to wit, this 30th day of June, 1961, for the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint should be and hereby is granted.
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