deaf to all pleas of violations of rights by a state of a citizen of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated, although not squarely decided, that sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the Constitution. See Pollard v. United States, supra. The Pennsylvania law seems in agreement as stated by Mr. Justice Jones, now Chief Justice Jones, in Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211, 219, 82 A.2d 244, 248: 'The suggestion that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial requires that he be sentenced timely is, of course, true.'
If this case with this delay had happened in the federal system, there is no question but what a constitutional right would have been violated. However, as stated before, the United States Supreme Court has never held that the Sixth Amendment freedoms are fully incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to find unconstitutional deprivation of this prisoner's rights it is necessary to find prejudice to him. As the findings set forth above indicate, we find there was prejudice in the instant case.
While agreeing that a sentence is valid if pronounced within a reasonable time, under the circumstances in this particular case the deferring of the sentence for this long period is clearly unreasonable.
As Mr. Justice Wright in his dissenting opinion in the instant case stated: 'Justice delayed is justice denied.' (188 Pa.Super. 220, 146 A.2d 633)
I agree with him, and I, too, feel very strongly that three years is a very unreasonable time under the circumstances of this case; and further I find that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.
The decision on this matter makes it unnecessary for the Court to take up the second allegation of the petitioner that he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing.
This Opinion shall serve as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court.
Order Discharging Petitioner.
This matter having been regularly brought on for hearing upon the issues joined herein, and the same having been duly heard and submitted, and due consideration having been thereon had, it is by the Court now here ordered that the said named person, John Giovengo, in whose behalf the writ of habeas corpus was sued out is illegally restrained of his liberty, as alleged in the petition herein, and that he be and he is hereby discharged from the custody from which he has been produced.
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