for denying a petition merely because a party urges grounds that he claims to have discovered recently. Orders of the commission are presumed to be valid. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.) Carolina Scenic Coach Lines v. United States, supra (56 F.Supp. 337).
The other two contentions advanced by the plaintiff relate to the merits of the commission's findings and conclusions on the record before it, and specifically, challenge is directed to the commission's evaluation of the evidence on the issue of the public necessity for plaintiff's service, and the inadequacy of existing service. Examination of these contentions necessarily requires consideration of plaintiff's contention that, as a result of the withdrawal of Youngstown, the quantum of evidence in the record has been materially reduced to the point that the commission's findings and conclusions cannot rest on substantial evidence. Before the Examiner, plaintiff had the burden of proof to affirmatively establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the public convenience and necessity required authorization of his proposed operations. The issues raised by the plaintiff regarding merits of the commission's decision necessarily involve an application of the 'substantial evidence' test as found in Universal Camera, supra. As is indicated above, this court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the commission, and the findings must stand if they are supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff contends that the commission ignored pertinent evidence, which evidence warranted reversal of the original decision, in effect asserting that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the commission's findings and conclusions. His assertions on these points must be rejected.
At the outset it is to be noted that the application did not present a complex problem. The Examiner, in his report, meticulously developed the factual circumstances of the case. First, plaintiff's ability with respect to his (1) past, presently authorized, and potential future operations, (2) equipment, (3) physical plant, and (4) financial structure, was set forth. Next, the evidence of each of the five shippers who supported the application were discussed with respect to their (1) amount and type of iron and steel shipped, (2) particular problems attendant to the shipment of their cargo, (3) loading and storage facilities, and (4) experience with existing carriers. Finally, the nature of the service presently available to each shipper was examined by detailing each of the protesting carrier's operations with respect to the (1) authorized items and routes of shipment, (2) nature of equipment available to those shipper's needs, and (3) availability and desire to service those shippers. One damaging item to plaintiff's application was developed on the issue of the inadequacy of existing service in that three of the supporting shippers had failed to make any inquiries whatsoever of several of the authorized carriers serving the destinations they desired, despite the fact that they were dissatisfied with the carrier they were using. It also must be borne in mind that the supporting shipper's complaints pertained exclusively to a period of time of abnormal steel shipments due to the fact that the steel industry at that time was experiencing a period of increased production in anticipation of a strike. The commission, after adopting the Examiner's recommended report, at pages 6 and 7 of its report, again specifically outlined the availability of the authorized service to the points of origin and destination. There is ample evidence in the record to support the commission's findings and conclusions, and this is true despite the withdrawal of Youngstown. It is to be noticed that the Examiner refers to Youngstown as one of the major motor carriers servicing Sharon Steel and Sawhill Tubular Products, Inc., but the commission demonstrated that group of protestants collectively service all the concerned origins and destinations. Plaintiff's counsel has made an able and clear presentation of his case, but the facts in the record simply do not warrant setting aside the commission's order or referring the matter back to the commission for rehearing.
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