The corporate assets included real estate located in the State of Indiana (see Exhibit A attached to Document No. 1). The fact that the real estate for which one acts as a broker is located outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not prevent applicability of the statute. 63 P.S. § 432(a).
Here the value of the land (without the improvements) was only a small part of the value of the corporate business, but it has been held that the statute applies in such instances.
The fact that no actual sale took place does not prevent the Act from applying.
Plaintiff made an attempt in Pennsylvania to negotiate a sale and arranged a meeting of the parties concerned in Pennsylvania for this purpose.
This activity is sufficient to bring his actions under the prohibitions of the statute. 65 P.S. §§ 432(a), 436 and 446.
The record is devoid of facts showing any contention that the sale of the 'business' and of the real estate were to be separate transactions so as to bring this case under the rule of Schoenfeld v. Meckes, 1950, 166 Pa.Super. 101, 70 A.2d 377.
Therefore, even though the Pennsylvania Brokers Act would not apply to an action for the sale of stock,
it would be a bar to an action for commissions for finding a buyer for the corporate assets which include real estate.
The foregoing discussion requires that the corporate defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. See Housing Authority of City of Allentown, Pa. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 3 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 932; New Wrinkle v. John L. Armitage & Co., 3 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 753; United States for use of Kolton, etc. v. Halpern, 3 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 590.
In view of the discussion under I-III above, it is not necessary to consider whether the record now before the court requires the conclusion that plaintiff did not fulfill the terms of the alleged contract in producing the offer described in the Complaint.