whether by reason of the failure of Congress to specifically deny the employee's attorneys' compensation the courts should look to applicable state law. The plaintiffs contend that where Congress is silent the courts should not ascribe to Congress an inequitable intent.' Plaintiffs' brief, p. 15.
From this circumstance, they argue that the Pennsylvania decisions, notably Furia v. City of Philadelphia, 1955, 180 Pa.Super. 50, 118 A.2d 236 (where plaintiff's attorney was permitted recovery on the theories of subrogation and the creation of a fund from which the City was reimbursed its workmen's compensation outlay), and Meehan v. City of Philadelphia, 1957, 184 Pa.Super. 659, 136 A.2d 178, 181 (where it was stated that in Pennsylvania 'subrogation is a matter of pure equity'), apply and that this permits a recovery by plaintiffs under the Rules of Decision Act, § 1652 of the Judicial Code of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 944, 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
Unfortunately for plaintiff's they overlook the fact that the equity jurisdiction of the Federal Courts differs from that of the State Courts. The general rule is stated at 19 Am.Jur., Equity § 11 as follows:
'The equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts is derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States; and throughout the different states of the Union the jurisdiction of these courts in equity is uniform and unaffected by state legislation.'
See Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 1893, 150 U.S. 202, 14 S. Ct. 75, 37 L. Ed. 1052.
As a consequence the many authorities cited by plaintiffs in their well-prepared briefs have no application to the facts at hand.
Plaintiffs argue, contrary to the defendant, that Lewis v. Railroad Retirement Board, 1951, 256 Ala. 430, 54 So.2d 777, certiorari denied 1952, 343 U.S. 919, 72 S. Ct. 677, 96 L. Ed. 1333, supports plaintiffs' theory of the instant case. They say that the State Court decided Lewis on the basis of whether the lien of the Board or the lien of the employee's attorney was superior, and applying Alabama law determined that the Board's lien, being first in time, was superior to that of the attorney. From this they argue that this Court by applying Pennsylvania law, will reach a conclusion directly opposite to that reached by the Alabama court under the unique lien way of that State. We believe that the Alabama court reached the right conclusion, but for the wrong reason. No State law and no State decision can divest or downgrade a federal lien in the absence of the consent of Congress. This is clear from the authorities above cited.
Plaintiffs also argue that the cases cited by the defendant, decided under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950, have no value in helping the Court in solving the problems presented by the instant case. We disagree. We think those cases are most helpful because they make it clear that when Congress wants an attorney's fee paid out of money returned to the Government by way of a lien, it knows how to use language to accomplish the purpose. The cases referred to are Davis v. United States Lines Co., 3 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 262; Oleszczuk v. Calmar Steamship Corp., D.C.D.Md.1958, 163 F.Supp. 370; Davis v. United States Lines Co., D.C.1957, 153 F.Supp. 912 decided by my able colleague, Judge Van Dusen; Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1952, 106 F.Supp. 461, affirmed sub nom. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 2 Cir., 205 F.2d 151, certiorari denied Fontana v. Huron Stevedoring Co., 1953, 346 U.S. 886, 74 S. Ct. 137, 98 L. Ed. 390. See also Voris v. Gulf-Tide Stevedores, Inc., 5 Cir., 211 F.2d 549, certiorari denied 1954, 348 U.S. 823, 75 S. Ct. 37, 99 L. Ed. 649.
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that defendant's motion to dismiss must be granted as this Court has no jurisdiction and plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action.
It is so ordered.